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THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION:
A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH
Joseph M. Dodge, II*
first amendment to the Constitution begins with the words:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...." 1 Although there
is clearly some overlap between the establishment and free exercise
clauses,2 there is a fundamental distinction between the two: the
establishment clause is applicable when government adopts a policy
to aid religion generally or to confer benefits upon some religions
in preference to others; the free exercise clause is invoked where
state action has an inhibitory effect upon an individual's beliefs or
a religious group's ritual practices.3 The former is thus a more specific prohibition against the promotion of religion or religions by the
state, while the free exercise clause expresses basic American notions
about the autonomy of the individual and the restriction of government to its proper sphere.4
No overriding theory has heretofore been proposed capable of
allocating the various rules of decision in free exercise cases according to an appropriate classification of fact situations. This Article
suggests an objective sociological approach to defining and weighing
the governmental and religious interests inhering in a given free
exercise claim in order to eliminate value preferences from the
constitutional weighing process. Religious interests will be ranked
according to functional criteria internal to all religious systems and
not dependent upon the belief content of any given sect. State interests will be analyzed in terms of formalized modes of governmental action involving action generally and religion in particular,
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I. The first amendment has been made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940).
2. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). See generally Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) Gustice Stewart, concurring); Kurland, Of Church
a11d State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. I (1961); Note, The Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause: Conflict or Coordination?, 48 MINN. L. REv. 929 (1964).
3. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963).
4. See United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1930) (Chief Justice Hughes,
dissenting), overruled by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
For general discussions of the free exercise clause, see Fernandez, The Free Exercise of Religion, 36 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 546 (1963); Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806 (1958); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and Doctrinal Development: Part I, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1381 (1967).
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taking into consideration certain constitutional limitations on state
power over the individual, over interpersonal relationships, and over
intragroup behavior. The resulting method of adjusting competing
governmental and religious interests may be characterized as valueneutral, and is capable not only of rationalizing past free exercise
decisions, but also of resolving current controversies and of suggesting the direction of future development.
I.

SCOPE OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

A. Basic Approach
Before formulating rules of decision appropriate for particular
fact situations, two extreme philosophies of adjudication under the
free exercise clause must be dealt with. Some commentators contend
that the free exercise clause, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, embodies personal rights which are entitled to absolute protection
against state power. 5 Without analyzing this proposition in detail,
it should be noted that its rationale as usually presented is primarily
political: speech of "governing importance . . . includes the vast
range of forms of thought and expression by which the voter might
equip himself to exercise a proper judgment in casting his ballot." 6
Unfortunately, it is not at all clear how religious freedom relates to
the political process. Although religion may have some public and
instrumental aspects, its essence resides in its private and personal
qualities; thus, courts have traditionally concluded that the core
of the free exercise clause is freedom of conscience and belief. But if
these freedoms are considered to be ends in themselves,7 nothing is
to prevent the constitutional definition of the powers of government
or the nature of the political process from being similarly exalted.
If, on the other hand, all of the terms and provisions of the Constitution are equally means for attaining the goals set forth in the preamble, the free exercise clause is no higher in priority than, for
example, the commerce clause. Either way, the fact that liberty appears to be of a different nature than governmental power does not
controvert the fact that both are formally in the same position visa-vis the Constitution. Thus, the legitimate claims of neither religion
5. See Freeman, supra note 4.
6. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. I, 13 (1965). See, e.g., Meiklejohn, The Balancing of
Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 4 (1961); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 145 (1959) (Justice Black, dissenting).
7. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 879-81 (1963); id. at 879: "[S]uppression of belief, opinion, and expression is an
affront to the dignity of man, a negation of man's essential nature."

February 1969]

Free Exercise of Religion

681

nor government assume an a priori precedence over those of the
other.
At the other end of the philosophical spectrum is the restrictive
theory of the free exercise clause, which gives conclusive deference
to the legislative judgment for all but the most flagrant interferences
with religious freedom. Given a legitimate governmental end, the
function of courts is said to be merely to ascertain whether the legislature "could in reason have enacted such a law." 8 A less sophisticated version of this theory is frequently encountered in state court
decisions: once the statute or ordinance is found to curb religious
"action" as opposed to "belief," the role of courts is reduced to upholding the law as a valid exercise of state police power to regulate
safety, health, morals, and welfare. 9 However, the Constitution is
concerned with permissible legislative means as well as permissible
ends.10
An analysis of the free exercise clause need not begin with any
slogans or political philosophies. Rather, we must seek solutions in
the realm of principles that are somewhat less abstract-principles
capable both of accurately defining the various interests involved in
a given free exercise claim and of weighing them properly. As the
following discussion will show, such a goal has not yet been fully attained.

B. Current Free Exercise Doctrine
Courts and commentators have offered various tests and distinctions as rules of decision in free exercise cases, but these tests are
either artificial, productive of inconsistent results, or incapable of
explaining the true policies behind the free exercise clause. Worse,
the tests offered to date involve blatantly subjective attempts to
balance governmental and religious policies without defining the
real interests in controversy.

I. Prohibitions and Compulsions
It would hardly be satisfactory to decide a free exercise case by
simply characterizing the activity affected by state action as either
8. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647 (1943) (compulsory flag-salute case) Gustice Frankfurter, dissenting); cf. Kurland, supra note 2, at 7.
9. E.g., Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942).
10. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hammett, The Homogenized
Wall, 53 A.B.A.J. 929, 932-33 (1967) (the establishment clause forbids the state from
using religious means to achieve secular ends); cf. Meiklejohn, supra note 6. One of
the main theses of this Article is that even with respect to secular means used to
achieve secular goals, some means are more permissible than others. Sherbert v.
Verner, ll74 U.S. ll98 (1963).
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"religion," which is therefore protected, or "nonreligion," which is
the proper subject of state power. Yet, the use of such simplistic
categories has a long history in free exercise law. The first "pure"
free exercise case, Reynolds v. United States,11 upheld a bigamy conviction against a Mormon who practiced polygamy. Chief Justice
Waite-referring to a statement by Thomas Jefferson that the legislative powers of government reach action alone and not opinions-concluded: "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere
opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation
of social duties or subversive of good order." 12 Underlying this delimitation of religious liberty is the fear that to permit a criminal
defendant to excuse his unlawful act because of his religious belief
"would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen
to become a law unto himself." 13 That is good rhetoric, but it avoids
the problem of examining the policies underlying the free exercise
clause in order to determine what is lawful religion in the constitutional sense. The belief-action dichotomy does not necessarily follow
either from the above reference to Jefferson or from another statement by him cited in Reynolds: "It is time enough for the rightful
purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order." 14 At
worst, this statement is ambiguous; at best, it appears to suggest something akin to a clear-and-present-danger test. 15 Most important, the
distinction between religious belief and action ignores the reality of
a religion which is seriously practiced.16 Since almost every manifestation of religion that is cognizable by the state can be labelled "action," a literal application of the belief-action dichotomy would ef11. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
12. 98 U.S. at 164.
13. 98 U.S. at 167.
14. 98 U.S. at 163.
15. Thus, the Court, speaking of Reynolds in 1963, could state: "The [religiously
motivated] conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial
threat to public safety, peace or order. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States • • • ."
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). The Supreme Court of 1878 had a rather
culture-bound, not to say intolerant, conception of nonconforming religions. See
Freeman, supra note 4, at 825; cf. the "modem" concept of religion expressed in
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
16. State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 868-69, 239 P.2d 545, 550
(1952) (dissenting opinion):
There is rarely any need of court intervention to protect freedom to believe,
since there are not many ways in which a state, even if it would, could impair
that freedom. Appellant apparently has the idea, which should not be considered
quaint, that religion is not something which need only be thought about between
the hours of eleven and noon on Sunday morning, but must be expressed in
daily living.
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fectively write the free exercise clause out of the Constitution.
Moreover, any method of analysis so dependent upon uncritical
characterization cannot avoid the appearance of sometimes being
arbitrary. 17
Other distinctions have been offered as rules of decision in free
exercise cases: activity versus passivity on the part of the religious
believer, and harm to self versus harm to others. 18 However, these
dichotomies have not by themselves yielded wholly consistent results.
Thus, it has been held that the state cannot compel an adult J ehovah's Witness to receive life-saving blood transfusions, but that the
state can force a Christian Scientist to submit to a vaccination. 19
The religious believers in both situations are equally passive. Perhaps the decisions can be reconciled on the ground that in the vaccination case a contagious disease poses a potential threat to the
public, whereas one who allows himself to expire by natural causes
is a danger to nobody. But the concept of harm to others only leads
to further questions: Does harm include moral degradation, or does
it refer only to physical injury? Does the category of "others" include
the believer's fellow communicants, or does it denote only those
outside of the sect? How much deference is owed to the legislature's
lack of sensitivity to these distinctions?
Finally, some courts have spoken of a clear-and-present-danger
test, but this approach is used almost exclusively in health regulation
cases. Although the clear-and-present-danger formulation has been
employed in a case concerning religious freedom, the decision in
the case rested upon the political core of the first amendment. 20 This,
coupled with the fact that the doctrine originated in a context of
seditious libel,21 should warn against its relevance in areas where
legislative objectives are more mundane: preventing fraud, controlling traffic in marijuana, and maintaining health and morals.
Moreover, although courts may pretend to weigh probabilities of
danger, they are more likely to follow the legislative assumption that
some danger to society exists.22 Perhaps decisive is the fear of the
17. See Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1949) (conviction for snakehandling affirmed, but with a statement that the law does not prevent anyone from
believing that handling poisonous snakes is a necessary part of religious worship).
18. In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 368, 372, 205 N.E.2d 435, 439, 442 (1965).
19. In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 367, 372, 205 N.E.2d 435, 439, 442 (1965);
Moore v. Draper, 57 S.2d 648 (Fla. 1952).
20. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634-35 (1943).
21. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
22. Wright v. DeWitt, 385 S.W.2d 644 (Ark. 1965); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291
Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942) (danger found to exist, even though no actual evidence
thereof).
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supposed practical and theoretical consequences if religious exemptions to criminal laws and health regulations were judicially
granted. 23

2. Legislation for the Public Good: Of "Indirect" Burdens
Another class of cases considers the effect upon religious practices of general regulations promoting the public welfare. It has been
suggested that where speech is involved, the result should be the
same as in free speech cases; where speech is not the predominant
element, courts should strive for equality of treatment with other
religions. Thus, once a law of general applicability is found to be
within the legislative power of the state, the courts must carve out
no exceptions for religious believers so long as the purpose or primary effect of the statute is not to prohibit or discriminate against
a particular religious practice. 24 Moreover, where the legislature itself has granted a religious exemption, it must be construed to apply
equally to all religions. 25
Unfortunately, the no-discrimination principle has been unpredictably applied. In Braunfeld v. Brown, the Supreme Court upheld
a statute which banned commercial activity on Sunday but made no
exception in favor of those worshipping on other days. 26 Appellants
contended that the law discriminated against their religion by compelling them to choose between observing a basic tenet of their faith
and working on Saturday. On the other hand, in Sherbert v. Verner, 27
the Supreme Court held that South Carolina could not constitutionally withhold unemployment benefits from one who, for religious
reasons, was unwilling to accept Saturday employment. As in Braunfeld, the effect of the state requirement was to force the individual
to choose between the practice of his religion and his employment.
Since both cases imposed equivalent de facto burdens upon minority
religions, the distinction, if any, between the two certainly cannot
be made according to a no-discrimination principle.
If discrimination is not the key to these cases, perhaps some sort
of weighing of state interests is involved. The following passage from
Braunfeld is suggestive:
23. E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
24. Fernandez, supra note 4, at 564-66; Kurland, supra note 2; cf. Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
25. Washington Ethical Soc. v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394
(1957). See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
26. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). Twenty-one of the thirty-four states having Sunday-closing
laws do have exceptions for those wishing to worship on other days. Id. at 614 Gustice
Brennan, dissenting).
27. 374 U.S. 398 (1963),

Free Exercise of Religion
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If the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its
power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's
secular goals, the statute is valid despite the indirect burden on
religious observance unless the State may accommodate its purpose
by means which do not impose such a burden. 28

One aspect of this test, contained in the "unless" clause, is the principle that a given statute may be invalid if the state has an alternative
means, less burdensome on the religion, of accomplishing the desired
end. It seems that such an alternative-means test would be an
appropriately value-free-hence judicial-standard for review. However, it remains to be seen whether or not this test was actually applied in either Braun/eld or Sherbert. Although the Braunfeld Court
did indeed mention the possibility of alternatives, it did so from the
point of view of the legislature's rational judgment that a Sabbatarian exemption would seriously preclude the attainment of the
secular goal. 20 Properly expressed, the Court's real concern was with
the legislature's freedom to select and define such secular goals. The
Court concluded that "to strike down, without the most critical
scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the
exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful
the religious practice itself, would radically restrict the operating
latitude of the legislature." 30 Policy-weighing was clearly apparent
in the decision: arrayed against the "indirect burden" of making
the practice of Mr. Braunfeld's religion "more expensive" was a
formidable congeries of state interests, including increased economic
efficiency through greater physical and spiritual health, opportunity
for families and friends to gather together, and the special Sunday
atmosphere of peace and tranquility. 31
Of course, the noncriminal burden upon appellant's religion in
Sherbert was arguably even more indirect than it was in Braunfeld.32
Although the Court again referred to the alternative-means qualification, it did not rely on that test because the merely "colorable" state
interest in preventing fraudulent claims was insubstantial: "In this
highly sensitive constitutional area, 'only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation ... .' " 33
It is submitted that, insofar as courts assume the attitude of a
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

366 U.S.
366 U.S.
366 U.S.
366 U.S.
Sherbert
374 U.S.

at
at
at
at
v.
at

607.
608-09. See Fernandez, supra note 4, at 584.
605-06.
607.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 417 (1963) Gustice Stewart, concurring).
406-07.

686

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67:679

super-legislature, weighing tests of the kind used in these two cases
are both confusing and susceptible to abuse. This remains true even
when courts profess to defer to the legislature's balancing of means
and ends. In Braunfeld the Court found the interests of the state
to be those set forth in the companion case of McGowan v. Maryland;34 there, however, the interests asserted were intended merely
to demonstrate a secular purpose for Sunday-closing laws under the
establishment clause. But, while it is one thing to show a secular
purpose by means of ex post facto reasoning about state "interests,"
it is quite another to conclude that somehow such interests outweigh
a claim premised upon the free exercise clause, or that a Sabbatarian
exemption would not be a viable alternative to a Sunday-only-closing
law. In sum, the Court in Braunfeld and Sherbert gave the unfortunate impression that it was rationalizing and speculating about policies without any standard to evaluate the strength of competing
claims.
The folly of a policy-weighing approach is best illustrated by two
recent cases in which religious adherents were required to participate in judicial proceedings contrary to their convictions. In People
v. Woodruf!, 35 a witness was compelled to testify before a grand jury
investigating alleged use of narcotics, despite the witness' claim that
her Hindu belief counseled against testifying because it was wrong
to harm others. The New York intermediate court cited Sherbert
and assumed that a balancing test was called for: "We balance, then,
the interest of the individual right of religious worship against the
interest of the state which is sought to be enforced.'' 36 Of course, the
court concluded that the claim of the state was more compelling:
The community is entitled to the assistance and information of its
members in seeking out and controlling the commission of crime .
. . . If it were otherwise, the fabric of society might be pierced and
fatally rent by a religious belief sincerely held by an individual in
action or inaction damaging to the continued existence of peace and
order in the community.37

Whatever one may think about the result of Woodruff, it must be
conceded that the New York court invoked general policy considerations to obscure the fact that the witness was not herself charged with
34. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The Court quoted Blackstone (4 COMMENTARIES 63), at 434:
"It humanizes, by the help of conversation and society, the manners of the lower
classes; which would otherwise degenerate into a sordid ferocity and savage selfishness
of spirit; it enables the industrious workman to pursue his occupation in the ensuing
week with health and cheerfulness."
35. 26 App. Div. 2d 236, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966), afj'd, 21 N.Y.2d 848, 236 N.E.2d
159 (1968).
36. 26 App. Div. 2d at 238, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
37. 26 App. Div. 2d at 238-39, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 789-90.
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any crime and to ignore the alternative of making some accommodation to her religious claim. It might have been possible, for example,
to compel her testimony only after it was concluded that no one
else could be found to testify concerning the same matter. The Minnesota Supreme Court provided an even more unsatisfactory opinion
in In re ]enison, 38 where the religious adherent was held in contempt
of court for refusing to serve on a jury. After noting that the burden
upon defendant's free exercise was slight, the court proceeded to
give a dissertation about the overwhelming interest of society in the
jury system.
Such experience with the balancing test tempts one to generalize
that: (1) the state always wins; (2) courts scarcely notice the religious
interest, much less attempt to analyze it; (3) courts do not really
analyze the state's interest either; (4) neither courts nor attorneys
accurately delineate the real issues; and, (5) judicial opinions proceed in terms of policy rather than more justiciable standards. Although accepting the necessity for some kind of "weighing" test, I
categorically reject the "ad hoc balancing" approach as being arbitrary, useless, and too insensitive to the special competencies of
legislatures and the judiciary. The appropriate role of the courts is
not to balance policies-that, presumably, has already been done by
the drafters of the Constitution, by basic social values, and by the
legislatures-but rather to define interests of both religion and
government in terms from which it is possible to generalize about
future disputes.
It has not been the primary purpose of this brief survey to
criticize the results of the decided cases-the outcome of the Sundayclosing-Iaw cases, for instance, is certainly defensible. 39 Nor has the
intention been to reject all of the tests and distinctions that have
been offered by courts and commentators. Rather, this critique has
been directed toward the point that there is neither a set of principles
which allocates rules of decision to particular types of fact situations,
nor objective criteria for assigning weights to religious and governmental interests in various contexts.
II.

TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

We start with the notion that since religious freedom is not related to the governing process or (except perhaps indirectly) to a
38. 265 Minn. 96, 99-102, 120 N.W.2d 515, 518-19 (1963). The decision was soon
reversed by the Supreme Court, 375 U.S. 14 (1963) (per curiam).
39. See Note, State Sunday Laws and the Religious Guarantees of the Federal Constitution, 73 HARV. L. REv. 729 (1960). For a general criticism of the result see Barron,
Sunday in North America, 79 HARV. L. REv. 42, 52-53 (1965).
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policy of unifying American society, the Brennan-Meiklejohn socialutility test40-which focuses on the value to the political process of
any form of expression-is inappropriate. Therefore, if one accepts
the premise that under the free exercise clause the practice of religion is an end in itself, the search for values and policies underlying
that clause should begin with an analysis of religion as such-specifically, how it satisfies the psychological, spiritual, and social needs
of its adherents. Since viewing religious freedom as an end in itself
means that it is unrelated to the structure and powers of government, a discussion of the scope of the free exercise clause must not
stop with an analysis of religion alone. There must also be an examination of situations in which government can and should-and
the areas in which it need not-accommodate religion. Although the
two inquiries are analytically distinct, certain values and lines of
argument are common to both.

A. Interests of Religion
Although religious "action" is susceptible to various forms of
governmental intervention, it has been conceded that religious
"belief" is absolutely protected.41 But since the belief-action distinction cannot be uncritically accepted, 42 the present task is to determine what kinds of religious action should be protected, first of
all, from the point of view of religion itself.
I. Traditional Judicial Attitudes Toward Controversies

Involving Religion
Courts deciding free exercise cases have been reluctant to relate
religious doctrine to the decision of particular disputes. In Watson
v. ]ones, 43 for instance, the Supreme Court faced the question of
which party in a denominational schism was entitled to certain
church property; it held that the dispute had to be resolved by the
appropriate governing organ of the church itself, rather than by a
judicial inquiry into the doctrinal purity of the competing parties.
The Court, reading the free exercise and establishment clauses together, stated that "[t]he law knows no heresy, and is committed to
40. See authorities cited, note 6 supra. I do not, however, mean to imply that
Justice Brennan himself would apply the social-utility test to the free exercise area.
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
41. E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). See text accompanying
notes 11-17 supra.
42. Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806, 826 (1958).
See Fernandez, The Free Exercise of Religion, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 546, 566-67, 587
(1963); Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,
7 (1961); text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
43. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871).
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the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect."44 In contrast
to the Chancellor in England, moreover, American judges have no
competence in ecclesiastical law or theology; where the subject of
the suit is ecclesiastical, the secular courts have no "jurisdiction." 45
As a matter of legal interpretation, however, the stricture against
inquiry into religious doctrine and organization should be severely
limited to situations like that at issue in Watson v. Jones-where
both parties base their claims on religious factors. The typical free
exercise case involves competing religious and governmental interests; since a court must accept jurisdiction and does in fact weigh
the interest of the state, it seems that procedural fairness requires
that equal attention be given to the interest of religion. An examination of theology in the usual free exercise case would not constitute
an attempt to determine true doctrine or heresy, but would merely
be a necessary first step in analyzing the religious claim.46
One positive approach to an analysis of religious action looks to
the place which a particular tenet has in the total scheme of the religion. A form of cultural anthropology, such a method claims to be
value-neutral. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 47 Justice Douglas so analyzed the role of selling and distributing Watchtower Society literature in the religion of the Jehovah's Witnesses. He found these
activities to be in reponse to a categorical commandment by God
and to be as important to Jehovah's Witnesses as worship and preaching are to the religions with which most Americans are familiar.
Although Justice Douglas correctly looked at the religion as a whole
rather than the subjective zeal of its individual practitioners, he did
44. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728. This language was quoted in Presbyterian Church in
the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 37
U.S.L.W. 4107 Gan. 27, 1969), where the Court held that the first amendment, as
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, prohibits a state court from
reviewing a decision of a church tribunal and awarding title of disputed property to a
local church on the ground that the actions of the general church amounted "'to a
fundamental or substantial abandonment of the original tenets and doctrines of the
[general church], so that the new tenets and doctrines are utterly variant from the purposes for which the [general church) was founded,'" 37 U.S.L.W. at 4107.
45. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729, 733.
46. With United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), this stricture against inquiry
into religious doctrine was finally put to rest, as was the notion that judges are incompetent by nature in the domain of theology. In only one area-fraud in advertising and selling religious therapy-has the heresy issue arisen. In United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), the Court attempted to side-step the question whether
or not the religious claim was false by relying on a test of intent to defraud. Although it might seem that the truth or falsity of the religious claim could have been
tested objectively, [see 322 U.S. at 89 (Chief Justice Stone, dissenting)), even that
approach would be futile, since the victims might have viewed the "reality" differently. In that event, such an objective test would effectively declare the beliefs of the
victims to be heresy. See 322 U.S. at 93-95 Gustice Jackson, dissenting).
47. !119 U.S. 105, 109 (1943).

690

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67:679

not make clear how his method avoids the dilemma of either conceding that religion is what the sect says it is, or comparing the practice to some form of religious activity known to Judaeo-Christian
tradition. 48
A more fruitful approach is present in those cases which recognize
that some religious tenets may not be compelled by the religion, but
instead are merely "believed in"; such tenets can be regulated by
government without disrupting the core meaning of the religion itself.49 Although this principle is not often explicitly set forth, it does
appear to have influenced the results of some cases. To take but one
example, the duty of a minister to castigate sin while preaching the
Gospel to his congregation would not seem to require that he use
obscenities offensive to the congregation's sensibilities. 50 Although the
principle which attempts to distinguish between tenets that are
beliefs and those that are compelled practices has frequently been
passed over, 51 it is a step in the right direction and will be elaborated
upon in the analysis of religious action proposed below.
Finally, there is the question of the degree to which courts are
willing to inquire into the sincerity with which a particular individual holds a belief. In religious fraud cases, the sincerity of the
belief is the key issue-even the essence of the charge. 52 There the
expressed view is that "[i]n such an intensely personal area ... the
claim of the registrant that his belief is an essential part of a religious
48. Such a method merely succeeds in reintroducing elements of subjectivity. See
People v. Ashley, 184 App. Div. 520, 172 N.Y.S. 282 (1918) (defendant, whether a
"medium" or a "fortuneteller," held not to be like an Old Testament prophet);
11.IcMasters v. State, 21 Okla. Crim. 318, 207 P. 566 (1922) (based upon the judges' ex•
perience with religion, fortunetelling held not to fall within that category). Although
cultural anthropology may have value in deciding what religion is in the first place,
it cannot tell us what is lawful religion. See Note, Right To Practice Black Muslim
Tenets in State Prison, 75 HARV. L. REv. 837, 838-39 (1962), in which the religious
and political components of the Black Muslim faith are, with some difficulty, sorted
out. See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 Gustice Clark for the majority), 188
Gustice Douglas, concurring) (1965). But see Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S.
573 (1944) (issue is whether or not practice is "protected religion').
49. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), is so interpreted by the California
Supreme Court. People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76, 394 P.2d 813, 821 (1964). For
cases supporting the converse (that "essential" practices therefore have a higher status),
see Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); People v. Woody, supra; State v.
Delaney, I N.J. Misc. 619, 122 A. 890 (1923).
50. See Delk v. Commonwealth, 166 Ky. 39, 178 S.'W. 1129 (1918).
51. See United States v. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. 612, 613 (E.D. Wash. 1943) (reversing
contempt conviction for refusal to serve on a jury, even though the judge could see
no connection between the refusal and defendant's religion). At the other extreme,
statutes banning the handling of poisonous snakes have been upheld, despite the fact
that the practice appeared to be central to the defendant's sect. E.g., Lawson
v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942).
52. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944). See People v. Ashley, 184 App.
Div. 520, 172 N.Y.S. 282 (1918).
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faith must be given great weight." 03 Yet, in many instances, and
sometimes without explaining why, courts are openly skeptical of a
particular claimant's sincerity.154 The trial court should be required
to make a finding of the existence, but not the degree, of the
claimant's sincerity; at a minimum, such an affirmative finding seems
necessary in order to lay the basis for an individual's standing to
challenge governmental action under the free exercise clause. 55 Once
standing has been established, however, the question of sincerity
need concern the court no longer; more formalistic and objective
criteria should then be brought into play.
2. An Analysis of Religious Action: The Theoretical Framework
We turn now from a discussion of traditional judicial attitudes
to a theoretical exposition of the nature of religious behavior-one
that is derived from sociological principles governing action in general. Parenthetically, if these theoretical explanations seem to be
confusing or difficult to grasp, the reader should be consoled by the
thought that they are not so important as the results which follow;
these results hopefully accord with common sense and experience.
The various religious interests will be ranked according to criteria
internal to religious systems as such, instead of according to American social and political values-although there is actually a striking
correspondence between the two realms. In short, a frankly sociological approach to the religious interest is being urged in order to
eliminate extrinsic value preferences from the constitutional weighing process. An analytical paradigm of such generality as to outline
the essential functional imperatives of any system of behavior will
be applied in order specifically to describe the major categories of
religious action. Such an objective approach accords with the notion
that the protection afforded by the free exercise clause should not
vary according to the belief contents of various religions. 56
a. Sociological principles governing action as such. 51 The func53. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965).
54. Dobkin v. District of Columbia, 194 A.2d 657 (D.C. App. 1963): State v. Bullard,
267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966) (alternative holding); cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. II (1905).
55. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963); In re Grady, 61 Cal.
2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964).
56. This point is constantly reiterated by Justice Douglas; see, e.g., Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 4II-12 (1963) (concurring opinion).
57. The main points in this subsection are taken from Talcott Parsons, An Outline
of the Social System, in I THEORIES OF SocIETY 30, 36-40 (1961). The following outline of the theory of action from a sociological perspective is extremely condensed,
partly from necessity, but partly because it is also felt that the important point for
the reader to grasp is not the mechanics of a particular sociological theory but rather
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tional imperatives of any system of behavior are derived from responses to problems posed both by the internal environment and
by the external environment. At the same time, a system can relate
to these problems either in universalistic or particularistic terms. A
universalistic mode is one which is founded upon some generalizable principle; for example, to adapt, one must be "efficient" or
"flexible" or "powerful"-predicates which can be validly applied
to any subject. The particularistic mode, on the other hand, focuses
on the specific subject and its identity; particularistic qualities are
"given" or are conceived of as being ends in themselves. The universalistic-particularistic dichotomy is somewhat like the distinction
between the internal and external environment, except that the latter refers to activities of the system and its components, while the
former refers to the way in which the system conceives of, and evaluates, itself. The combination of the internal-external and universalistic-particularistic dichotomies yields a fourfold paradigm (figure
1) containing four categories of action conceived of as functional imperatives for any system of behavior.
iFIGURE I

External Environment

Universalism

Particularism

Adaptation
(A)

Goal
Attainment

(Performance)

Internal Emironment
(Quality)

(G·A)

Pattern
~Iaintenance

Integration
(l)

(P-M)

The function of pattern maintenance involves maintaining the
stability of the limits of the system itself by providing patterns which
give it meaning. Integration relates to the mutual adjustment of subunits within the system in order to organize the smooth functioning
of the system as a whole. The function of goal attainment is defined in terms of the directional flexibility needed to lessen the
tension between the needs of the system and the varying conditions
the fact that the categories of religious action do have a logical and analytical (as
opposed to ad hoc empirical) derivation. The value of such a system lies in its
capacity to "rank" its own "interests" according to its functional needs as a system.
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in the environment that bear upon the satisfaction of such needs.
The function of adaptation arises from the problem of allocating
limited means to a multiplicity of goals and the resulting calculation
of sacrifices and gains incidental to the attainment of those goals.
It should be evident that within the internal environment, the
pattern maintenance function is universalistic while the integration
function is particularistic. As the source of meaning for the system
as a whole, the symbolic or rational contents of the pattern maintenance function, viewed as a subsystem, are by their form valid for
all systems of a similar type. That is, statements about meaning are
universalistic because they relate the unit (a sect) to some larger
concept (such as goodness, truth, membership, unity) which is the
source of meaning. This is done either by placing the unit into some
larger frame of reference or by asserting that the unit is the only
unit which possesses a certain desirable quality (the implication
being that other units could have this quality, but, since they do not,
they are inferior). For example, the doctrine, "Jesus Christ is the
Son of God," is a universalistic source of meaning for a Christian
sect. The word "Jesus Christ" is the particularistic reference related
to the sect by the assumption that "I belong to a group which believes
in Jesus"; the word "Son" is a lead-in to the concept of God, who
has all the attributes of goodness and truth.
The four categories of the functional paradigm are neither static
nor mutually exclusive; a given system by its nature may change,
break down, or maintain its present boundaries. Also, among the
various functional categories, each viewed as a subsystem in its own
right, there are various inputs and outputs; some of those for the
religious action system are illustrated in figure 2. Finally, the described system has an evolutionary component expressed in terms
of the relative presence or absence of "functional differentiation"
among the subsystems.
b. A functional paradigm of the religious action system.58 The
subsystems or categories of the religious system, which are derived
from the functional paradigm governing action as such, are shown
in figure 2. 59 It must be kept in mind that this is a theoretical scheme,
and the categories are not derived from empirical generalization.
Rather, they attempt to specify the elements of religious action in
58. Much of the following analysis is adapted from Bellah, Some Suggestions for
the Systematic Study of Religion (mimeo) (permission kindly granted by the author)
(1955). It would be very difficult to separate Bellah's analysis from my own modifications, but any deviations from theoretical consistency are attributable to me.
59. Adapted, with omissions and modifications, from Bellah, supra note 58, at 10,
13, 14.
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terms of the functional imperatives described above. The religious
system is defined briefly as that which relates values having to do
with "ultimate meaning," as elaborated in a system of culture, to a
given regime of social60 behavior. Its four functional categories are
stated below.
FIGURE 2
Ethical Action
(A)

Sem1on
Proselytization

Worship (Ritual,
Ceremony)
(G-A)

Facilities for
Sacrament

Faith, Belief,
Theology
(P-M)

Sacramental
Meaning

Therapy, SinRedemption
(I)

The pattern maintenance subsystem refers to the pattern of belief
and symbols of ultimate meaning or concern. Theology, dogmatics,
and the elaboration of symbols for liturgy are found here.
The integrative problem involves organizing a coherent system
of religious practice and belief for the multitude of members within
a given religious community who are confronted with varying social
or psychological strains. This is called the religious therapy subsystem. Starting with notions of alienation or sin, the aim of this
subsystem is to provide salvation-a restoration of spiritual wholeness or health-to the members of the sect by means of "saving"
techniques such as sacrament, the power of faith, and acts of confession or charity.
60. This is a good place to emphasize that I am discussing religion as a social
system. It might be objected that the first amendment has largely to do with individual liberty and personal conscience, and therefore that my analysis is irrelevant.
But that is to assert the conclusion before the reasoning. All I am saying at this
point is that religion should be analyzed from the point of view of a social system
because of legally relevant considerations of objectivity, analytical consistency, case of
application, and efficiency. Moreover, a sociological analysis is not irrelevant even if
one accepts an individualistic interpretation of the first amendment, because (I) the
social system itself specifies "roles"-sets of expectations held by the social unit and
other social actors concerning the individual's identity and performance; and (2) the
social system interacts with the individual himself on the level of personal motivation and moral conscience.

February 1969]

Free Exercise of Religion

695

The goal attainment subsystem is referred to as worship. The
functional problem here arises from the need to reinforce commitment to the aims of the sect. Ceremony and ritual are the chief
mechanisms by which the group defines itself in terms of action as
opposed to pure doctrine; liturgy can be viewed as symbolic of the
individual's identification with group values and needs. The ritual
may relate both to the natural environment (in the form of sympathetic magic) or to the spiritual realm (in propitiation of the
Divinity). The output from worship to the therapy subsystem is the
facility for sacrament, and the output to the ethical action subsystem
is sermon-the public commitment to ethical action.
Finally, the adaptive function concerns relating religion to
everyday life by means of ethical action. On the most general level,
this function regulates the balance of public versus in-group commitment. The aim of this subsystem is the achievement of moral
acceptability in religious terms by means of the actual performance
of ethical acts. The output from ethical action to the therapy subsystem is acts of confession or charity-"justification by works"while the output to the worship subsystem is proselytization-the
obtaining of new members for the religious group. Ethical action
may range from the type of evangelism practiced by Jehovah's Witnesses, to various optional forms of charity, to actions like polygamy,
the religious content of which is not immediately apparent to outsiders.
The above fourfold classification is inherent in mature religions.
Conversely, "primitive" religion is defined sociologically not by
the content of the belief system or by particular strange tenets, but
rather by the absence of differentiation among the four functional
subsystems. On a different level of analysis, a primitive religion is
also characterized by the absence of differentiation betv1een the
religion itself and other social and cultural systems, particularly
kinship, political organization, law, role-playing, science, and artistic
expression. In analyzing a given free exercise claim, one should view
the sect to which the claimant belongs in its entirety. If the religious
subsystems cannot be distinguished, the religion should be characterized as primitive. If the tenet in question is only a relatively
minor aspect of the religion-a residue of or regression to a prior
stage of social evolution-it should, for purposes of this analysis, be
considered in terms of whichever of the four functional subsystems
it most closely resembles. To take some examples, polygamy may be
indicative of a fusion of religion with social and kinship organization. Yet it is doubtful whether the practice of polygamy alone could
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characterize the Mormon Church of the nineteenth century as being
a primitive religion, especially since the ethical aspect of polygamy
completely overshadowed whatever other religious functions could
be attributable to it. On the other hand, such practices as snake
handling, seance, and use of peyote for worship appear to be primitive in the sense that various religious phenomena-liturgy, sacrament, worship, and evangelism-are combined in various degrees
and proportions in one practice. Nevertheless, of these examples only
peyote worship, since it constitutes practically the entire religion
for those American Indians who practice it, can be clearly said to
be a primitive religion.
3. Legal Consequences

a. Primitive religions. A primitive religion in which the subsystems are undifferentiated should be considered in a separate
category for legal purposes in two circumstances: when the entire
religion-not merely one of its tenets-can be characterized as primitive, and when the primitive sect is, from the point of view of social
structure, isolated and self-contained. Given a legitimate governmental interest as well as a clear political commitment to advance
"civilization," a primitive sect should not be given any blanket
exemption from secular law-even if that law is designed ultimately
to erode the traditional religion. Unfortunately, the ability to
recognize a primitive religion does not help us to determine whether
it is entitled to more or less protection than that afforded to other
religions. But while this theoretical issue is perplexing, the fact
remains that today primitive religions in the sociological sense are
found almost exclusively among the American Indians, who historically have stood in a special relationship with the federal government. 61
61. Should the federal government decide to implement a policy of assimilation
with regard to the Indian through the enactment of social legislation, then the Indians' free exercise rights should be accorded neither a greater nor a lesser status
than the rights of other citizens. As to general regulations and criminal prohibitions
bearing upon religious freedom, the appropriate rule should defer to the decision
of the duly constituted tribal government in the case of on-reservation activity not
of a physically violent nature. This approach corresponds with the sociological principle that the social-cohesion interest of the sect may be quite intense, and indeed
the practice with respect to crimes or disputes on the reservations is very nearly the
one proposed. See Note, The Indian: The Forgotten American, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1818
(1968); cf. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 594 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
Such a principle need not be based on doubtful notions of sovereignty; rather it is
merely an acknowledgment of the reality of a unique historical and social condition
tolerated by both the polity and the Indians themselves. Eventually, however, it
should suffer the fate of the separate-but-equal doctrine as (and if) a national policy
of assimilation is adopted and implemented.
On the other hand, if the tribe itself suppresses the free exercise of religion, the
protection offered by the Constitution should not be waived just because the state

February 1969]

Free Exercise of Religion

697

b. Mature religions. The thesis of this Article is that the belief
and therapy subsystems of a mature religion should be absolutely
protected by the free exercise clause, that the worship subsystem
should also be protected so long as there is no demonstrable harm
outside of the worship group or severe physical injury within it,
and that the ethical action subsystem should receive a much lesser
degree of protection. The degree of protection afforded should depend upon what function the religious action performs rather than
upon the content of the motivating belief. Moreover, functional
analysis should take precedence even when a given religion places a
high valuation upon a particular form of ethical action. Thus, in the
Murdock case discussed above, it appears that Justice Douglas was
seduced into finding that distribution of religious literature on the
street "occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as
does worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits" 62 by
the fact that the Jehovah's Witnesses themselves placed such high
value on this form of evangelism. But according to the sociological
analysis proposed here, the practice in question clearly falls within
the category of ethical action, and the degree of legal immunity
afforded should depend upon that functional characterization.
The belief and therapy subsystems should receive absolute
protection because they relate by definition to the internal ordering
of the religious system and to the individual's orientation and commitment thereto. As such, belief and communion are of maximum
concern to the members of the sect and of minimal concern to
everybody else. 63 Moreover, on a psychological level, to impinge
upon an individual's conception of ultimate meaning, to interfere
with his sacrament, or to compel him to adopt a permanent condition
of sinfulness is to disrupt his most fundamental religious convictions.
On the other hand, worship and ethical action are both forms of
performance which necessarily entail social consequences. However,
the fact that worship is particularistic rather than universalistic
performance explains why worship ought to receive greater protection than ethical action: the social conduct involved in worship
relates, by definition, solely to members of the cult and is therefore
less likely to harm outsiders. Moreover, worship is the primary outlet
for expressing one's religious commitment publicly in collective
condones separatism; cf. Colliflower v. Garland, !142 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965). But see
Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 372 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
62. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1943).
63. Of course, the beliefs and sacraments of a religious group may well concern
others very intensely, but only on the level of their own contrary beliefs and conscience. I do not think that this level of concern is a "social" interest requiring governmental protection. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

698

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 67:679

ceremony and prayer; at the same time it provides the most conspicuous focus for the social identity of the religious group. Finally,
worship provides a key facility for the therapy subsystem-the
paraphernalia for sacrament. These characteristics are inherent in
worship as an analytical concept, and exist independent of the
value which the religion itself may place upon its goal attainment
function. In sum, the worship function, in addition to being a
primary means of expressing cult values and needs, 64 is the sine qua
non of religion as a social organization.
Ethical action presents an entirely different situation. Although
the norm that sanctions a given ethical practice may be of general
applicability, the particular ethical practice itself may be only one
of many possible derivations from such norm. This may explain
why many ethical tenets appear to have no necessary logical relationship to the core of the underlying belief system, but merely seem
to be derived from social, economic, or political origins. 611 Indeed,
there is a feeling that many religiously motivated ethical practices
are simply not "religious" within the common understanding of
that word. Ethical acts are directed to man, not to God or some
other core concept of a religion (except indirectly), while the emphasis of religion is the reverse. 66 These observations all accord with
the concept that ethical action, the adaptive subsystem of religion,
should be the lowest subsystem on the scale of priorities. Thus,
since particular ethical practices have no necessary logical or ontological relationship to the rest of the system, it would seem that any
sect frustrated by environmental hostility to one of its ethical practices could adapt to societal pressure by changing the offending
practice. The change could occur without necessitating any fundamental alterations in the other more "religious" functional subsystems.67 I do not suggest that a religion must, in any normative
64. See Fernandez, supra note 42, at 587. Giannella, in The Religious Liberty
Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1419-21 (1967), also points out the distinctions
between types of religious action. However, his criterion seems to be merely the
importance of a tenet to a particular religion on a sect-by-sect basis; therefore, the
evangelism of the Jehovah's Witnesses would be as protected as is sacrament generally,
65. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (polygamy); United States v.
Kissinger, 250 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1958) (refusal to limit production of grain); Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 256 F. Supp. 941 (D.S. Car. 1966) (refusal to serve Negroes
in restaurant).
66. This notion is expressed by the proposition that the essence of religion is
"belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation." United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1930) (Chief Justice
Hughes, dissenting).
67. For example, the Mormons changed their teachings in respect to polygamy in
1890, the same year that the Supreme Court, in Davis v. :Beason, 133 U.S. 333, upheld
a voting ban against advocates of polygamy; see Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S.
14, 16 n.1 (1946); :Bellah, supra note 58, at 11, 34.
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sense, undergo such an evolutionary process; I merely emphasize that
the standards for adaptation are "neutral." Therefore, a given
religion need not, in view of the variety of options available for
resolving conflicts with secular society, put all of its emphasis upon
any particular moral tenet. Although it is true that a religious sect
may so overcommit itself to a particular ethical practice in the
face of social or political hostility that it ultimately ceases to be
viable, no tears should be shed for such sociologically inflexible
entities.
Nevertheless, in the short run, state interference with religiously
derived moral tenets may acutely impinge upon religion, particularly
when the result is to compel action or abstention which is defined as
sinful by the therapy subsystem. When this occurs, religious ethical
action merits some protection by the first amendment. 68 But where
the therapy subsystem itself specifies that compulsion or an absence
of intent to violate the moral norm is an excuse for the act or omission constituting "sin," the need for this protection is obviously
lessened.
The practical advantages of using this functional paradigm in
the legal analysis of a free exercise claim are numerous. First, this
approach obviates the necessity of gauging the degree of emphasis
that a particular religion attaches to a given practice and the relative
strength of an individual's subjective beliefs. Second, such an analysis
ranks religious interests and yet remains value-neutral; that is, the
content of a belief is irrelevant and practices are not judged according to standards derived from Judaeo-Christian or American secular
norms. At the same time, it should be relatively easy for a court to
ascertain the formal distinctions among belief, sacrament, worship,
and ethical action. 00 Where ethical action itself is under attack, a
court can easily determine whether or not the state sanction results,
as a matter of principle for the sect, in a condition of sinfulness for
the believer, taking into account the doctrinal ability of the therapy
subsystem to resolve the dilemma.
The fourfold classification outlined above accords with common
sense and experience; therefore, judges need not master sociological
theory. Not the least of the benefits of the proposed approach is that
it is capable of rationalizing the mainstream of decided cases while
clarifying elements that ought to be considered in future controversies.
68. Fernandez, supra note 42, at 564-66, seems to say that religious actions not
involving worship or sacrament should receive no immunity, at least from the criminal
law, except where another specific first amendment right can be invoked.
69. Courts should also be able to identify exotic tenets which fall into one of these
categories and primitive religions as such. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
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B. Interests of Government
I. Constitutional Limitations on Governmental Action
Certain constitutional concepts that bear upon the relationship
between government and individuals, interpersonal associations, and
intragroup behavior serve to limit the governmental interest when
dealing with religious groups in the same manner as when government seeks to affect other social units. The same jurisprudential,
social, and practical considerations which tend to weaken the state
interest may also reinforce the distinction between worship and
ethical action and thus bear upon an evaluation ot the religious
claim itself.
a. The individual-private thoughts and actions. The heart
of individual liberty is freedom from direct governmental coercion
in the realm of ideas, beliefs, and opinions. 70 It matters not whether
these ideas are religious, ethical, economic, philosophical, scientific,
or political in nature. In other words, the "internal environment"
of the individual is beyond the pale of direct governmental intervention. The obvious corollary of this proposition is that the individual has considerable liberty in respect to the consumption of
ideas originating in his external environment; 71 part of the penum70. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 635-36 (1943); Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879-81 (1963).
71. These statements underlie the basic evolutionary trend in the area of obscenity
law. The Supreme Court in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), rejected an
all-encompassing definition of protected speech in terms of personal belief and e.xpression in favor of the "redeeming social value" test, which in turn is founded on
the notion of the social utility of exchanging ideas of political consequence. The
Court, however, implicitly admitted that immunity from state prohibition was available to advocacy of nonconforming moral values and for expressions of purely artistic
value. These expressions, too, can be said to have social, if not political, value in the
broad sense. Kingsley Intl. Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959);
Monaghan, Obscenity 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenit:-,• Per
Quad, 76 YALE L.J. 127 (1966); Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity,
1960 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 1, 16. See Emerson, supra note 70, at 880. Justice Brennan's discussion of Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), in The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. I, 18-19 (1965),
suggests that his "general theory" of the first amendment revolves around a notion
of social utility.
It would then seem that the proper theory on which to base the legislature's power
to control obscenity should be "sociological" and should therefore refer to the mech•
anisms and manner of its communication instead of its expressive purposes. Since
almost any material would pass muster under the "utterly without redeeming social
value" test as laid down in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), the "pandering" analysis set forth
in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), which focuses upon the manner
of distribution of the material, is now of dominant interest. See Supreme Court Note,
The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REv. 125, 186-94 (1966). I interpret the
new test to be open invitation by the Court to legislatures to frame their obscenity
laws according to the sociological theory proposed in the text. It has been strenuously
urged that government has no power to ban pornography from those who desire to be
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bra of the first amendment is the right of the individual to acquire
knowledge or obtain exposure to ideology.72 Thus, a state cannot
prevent a parochial school from teaching modern foreign languages, 73 nor can it force all children to attend only state schools.74
The state has traditionally asserted its interest in the area of
private conduct outside the realm of ideas only with respect to
attempted suicide and consumption of alcohol or drugs. Yet the
trend has clearly been away from attaching criminal sanctions to
these actions.75 Undoubtedly, one reason for this trend is a recogexposed to it. Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLUll!.
L. REv. 391 (1963), seems to say this without feeling any necessity to invoke the first
amendment. Monaghan, supra, at 138, rejects the substantive due process implications
of such a position, but agrees that the interest of the state here is weak and should
yield to any asserted constitutional right. Id. at 139-40. Even Henkin, supra, at 413
n.68, admits that the state has the power to act against "public" obscenity. Of course,
the state is said to have power to ban obscenity only because it has been decided that
the latter is not "protected speech" under the first amendment. But as a test to be applied to printed matter or private behavior, this rule is suspect. This can be seen by a
reading of the following passage from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942), which Justice Brennan relied upon in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 485 (1957):
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
J)roblem. These include the lewd and obscene [, the profane, the libelous, and
ihe insulting or "fighting" words and those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace]. It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality. fFootnotes omitted.] [The bracketed words are those which Justice
Brennan chose to omit.]
On its face, this dictum seems to refer to public utterances, as opposed to printed
literature. Accord, Delk v. Commonwealth, 166 Ky. 39, 178 S.W. 1129 (1915). If so, the
described type of behavior would be analogous to the inciting speech that was in fact
the matter for decision in Chaplinsky. Thus, with the original context restored, "the
lewd and obscene" reference probably means lewd or indecent conduct. To read the
phrase as Justice Brennan did in Roth leads to the unique conclusion that obscene
material is the only form of speech which can be banned as such by the state, in spite
of the fact that there is no proved connection with unlawful conduct. Monaghan,
supra, at 132, makes all of these points. Thus, if obscene matter were restored to its
proper place within the first amendment, a mere untested assertion by the state that
there was some connection with overt action would not have conclusive weight. Roth,
supra, at 508 ijustice Douglas, dissenting); cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ("gravity" of the evil).
Consistent with focusing upon the social communication of obscenity are the decisions of at least two courts which have construed their respective state obscenity laws
so as not to cover material held solely for the personal use or enjoyment of the person
who created it. In re Klor, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903, 415 P.2d 791 (1966); State v. Wetzel, 173
Ohio St. 16, 19, 179 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1962) (dictum).
72. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (dictum); Emerson, supra note
70, at 880. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); cf. Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
73. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
74. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
75. Thus, for example, under the Model Penal Code § 250.5 (Proposed Official
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muon of the inherent futility of prohibition as a means of controlling such private conduct; another reason is the feeling that a
person who attempts suicide or consumes harmful substances is
more likely to possess some kind of psychological disorder than to
have an evil intent.76 And, most relevant to the religious problem,
it has been argued with some force that suicide is simply none of
the state's business insofar as there are no serious collateral effects
on others.77 These considerations may have implications for the
way in which government should relate, as a matter of policy, to
such religious practices as drug-taking, self-immolation, and snakehandling. Without religion, these practices would probably be considered to be symptoms of mental disturbance. Should the state act
accordingly and "treat" these sociocultural "diseases" by education
and social legislation rather than by criminal prosecution? Or can
it be maintained that the state has no power at all to deal with these
practices on the ground that they are "healthy" from a given sect's
viewpoint? Perhaps the state has no more business saying what is
healthy or unhealthy for a particular sect than it does in weeding
out heresy or false opinions.
b. Binary consensual relationships. The leading case on the
question of binary relationships between consenting adults is Griswold v. Connecticut,78 which held that a state may not proscribe
the use of artificial birth control devices by a married couple.
At the same time, the Supreme Court conceded that the state
may act constitutionally in the realm of sexual morality, presumably even where the regulation impinges upon the privacy of
consenting adults. Apparently because the state itself sanctions the
Draft, 1962) the mere state of being under the influence of alcohol or drugs is not a
crime, except where such status constitutes a public "nuisance." The Model Code also
fails to list attempted suicide as a crime. In respect to suicide specifically, Grenville
Williams, in The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (1958), supports this trend.
76. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514 (1968), the Court by a five-to-four decision refused to hold that public intoxication
was beyond the pale of the criminal law. However, five Justices seem to have agreed
that Robinson establishes a constitutional requirement of mens rea in regard to public
crimes-or at least that the due process clause applying the eighth amendment
prohibits the states from defining diseases or "conditions," and, by implication, acts
which result therefrom, as substantive crimes, presumably because such diseases,
conditions and acts are in some sense "involuntary." 392 U.S. at 548-49 (Justice White,
concurring), 566-67 (four Justices dissenting).
77. "Society cannot stop a free man from committing suicide, nor should it try.
What can be done is to make sure that the determination upon self-destruction is
fixed and unalterable." G. "WILLIAMS, supra note 75, at 262. Thus, it cannot be said
that the state should cease to take an interest in these matters; nevertheless, governments are gradually discarding the old heavy-handed all-or-nothing methods in favor
of more flexible and rehabilitative solutions.
78. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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matrimonial status,79 however, the line was dra1-\rn at the point at
which state regulation interferes with marital intimacies. 80 If the
policy of the state is decisive, can the relationship between the free
exercise clause and the intragroup affairs of a religious sect be
analogized to the relationship between state laws sanctioning marriage and the husband-wife social unit? Marriage and religious
affiliation are similar in that they are both commonly described in
terms of status rather than temporary unilateral or bilateral consent. Even if the penumbra! right of privacy adds nothing of substance to the right of religious free exercise, it is certainly possible
that it may help to define the interests implicit in the free exercise
clause.
Outside the penumbra cast by the constitutional right of privacy
and assuming that the state has power to legislate in the area of
private sexual morality, the propriety of its exercise of this power
invokes competing values. A representative distillation of AngloAmerican jurisprudence holds that government should intervene in
these delicate matters, especially with the criminal law, only when
the conduct in question is openly offensive to others and only where
state action would be effectual. The appropriate function for the
state is not to prohibit conduct that is considered immoral but
rather to limit its effect by preventing it from spilling over into
society at large. 81 In practice, morals legislation appears to be of
decreasing repute. The Model Penal Code makes lewd behavior a
crime only when it actually offends others or threatens to become a
public nuisance; it even excuses "deviate sexual relations" between
consenting adults. 82 These considerations support the contention
79. 381 U.S. at 495 Gustice Goldberg, concurring).
SO. This distinction admittedly does not resolve all problems in the area; for example, would it be any less an invasion of "fundamental liberty" to sterilize unmarried, as opposed to married, persons? Compare Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)
with Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). And, if there is a substantive right to
preserve one's capacity to sire natural children, what about the analogous limits upon
freedom of choice imposed by various racial and religious classifications found in
current adoption laws?
Bl. Rostow, Enforcement of Morals, 1960 CAMB. L.J. 174, 179-80 (summarizing and
agreeing with the views of Lord Devlin). Considering alcoholism to be the subject of
criminal sanctions at least partly because society finds it to be morally and aesthetically
offensive, the various opinions set forth in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), strongly
imply that the state could not establish criminal sanctions to being drunk in the
privacy of one's home.
82. Section 21!!.2, Comment (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Section 251.l of the
Code defines lewdness as "[a]ny lewd act which [the actor) ••. knows is likely to be
observed by others who would be affronted or alarmed." See United States v. Klaw, 250
F.2d 155, 164 (2d Cir. 1965). Cf. Model Penal Code § 2.11(1) (Proposed Official Draft,
1962), which holds consent to be a general defense to crime where it controverts an
element of the offense or precludes the harm or evil sought to be prevented.
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that acts of worship in which only the sect members parttc1pate
should be afforded a high degree of immunity from government
regulation.
c. Voluntary associations. Freedom of association, whether in
connection with "political, economic, religious or cultural matters,"
is an "inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 83 This formulation implicitly recognizes that the right of association is not just an instrument to be used for goals of a political nature. Unfortunately, all of
the leading Supreme Court cases on the subject have dealt with
state regulation of associational relationships detrimental to the
public good; 84 none of the cases has dealt with intraorganizational
activity as such. Perhaps Dejonge v. Oregon85 could be cited for the
proposition that, when there is no incitement to action against
society at large, the state has insubstantial reasons for interfering
with an association's internal affairs; but there the intragroup activity involved only speech that was clearly protected in any event.
The interest of government with respect to immoral activity
within a group would seem to be tenuous; the state should not interfere unless the practice in question arouses such deeply felt feelings
of disgust in the public at large that it may be injurious to the
society. Even then, if the state must act against immoral intragroup activity, it should quarantine rather than prohibit it.8° Consistent with this theory, the Model Penal Code provides an affirmative defense to a defendant in an obscenity prosecution where the
obscene material is held for noncommercial dissemination to personal friends. 87 Also, in Roberts v. Clement 88 a state law banning
nudist colonies was struck down by a three-judge federal district
83. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
84. See New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928); United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); American Communications Association, C.I.O.
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). But cf. Kedrolf
v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344
U.S. 94 (1952).
85. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
86. Paraphrasing E. Rostow's paraphrase of the view of Lord Devlin, supra note
81, at 181. In addition, the legislature should consider whether moral values may
change in the foreseeable future in respect to the practice in question, and also
whether the o-iminal law is an appropriate and effective means for bringing about
the desired end. Id. at 180-81. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
87. Section 251.4(3) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Similar privileges are provided
for educators, scientists, and government officials. It would also appear that the
pandering analysis for obscenity cases promulgated in Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463 (1966), lends support to this thesis insofar as commercial exploitation ipso
facto precludes a concern with intragroup use.
88. 252 F. Supp. 835, 841-43 (E.D. Tenn. 1966). Accord, Excelsior Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of State University of N.Y., 3 N.Y.2d 237, 144 N.E.2d 31, 165 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1957).
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court. Two judges thought that the law was unconstitutionally vague,
but they also pointed to the common-law rule that indecent exposure or lewdness must be public in order to constitute a criminal
offense. The third judge stated that the law was an unconstitutional
abridgement of the right of association and the related right of
privacy; since the nudist colony was isolated from public contact,
the state had no interest in prohibiting it. 89 Similarly, religious
intragroup activity should not be prohibited as long as its consequences can be effectively confined within the group. 90
2. Modes of State Action

Subject to the above limitations, the state may have an interest
in accommodating religion by creating exemptions from secular
laws, compelling action or submission when necessary to protect
public health or welfare, prohibiting certain conduct defined as
inherently evil, and enacting broad social legislation that indirectly
impinges on religious interests.
a. Accommodation. Any effort by government to promote religion directly would collide head-on with the "wall" separating
church and state embodied in the establishment clause of the first
amendment. 91 Nevertheless, there is a narrow area in which the free
exercise clause allows the state to accommodate religion in spite of
this strong prohibition against establishment: if the legislature
creates a substantial burden upon a class of citizens, it may carve
out religious exemptions where the burden relates directly to an
important aspect of religion. 92 Once such an exemption has been
89. 252 F. Supp. at 848-50.
90. Some religious activities, such as evangelizing, can appropriately be classified as
speech. According to the free speech decisions of the Supreme Court, the first amendment posits an open society with respect to ideas and their advocacy. Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) ijustice Holmes, dissenting); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) ijustice Brandeis, concurring). There is no
reason why the expression of emotions and feelings, particularly when occurring in
circumscribed groups, should not enjoy the same protected status as political speech.
See Emerson, supra note 70, at 879-81, 938.
91. Compare Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) with Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
92. United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409, 414-15 (2d Cir. 1963) (dictum), affd,
380 U.S. 163 (1965); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 n.10 (1963) (dictum)
(government subsidy of armed-forces chaplains); State v. Grabinski, 33 Wash. 2d 603,
206 P.2d 1022 (1949) (Sabbatarian exemption for Sunday closing law). Judicial exceptions resulting from the free exercise clause itself have also been made. See Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (exception to availability-for-work requirement for state
unemployment compensation scheme); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813,
40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (exception to state narcotics law for peyote worship). Cf.
Pierce v. Lavallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961) (implied recognition of duty of state
prison to accommodate religious worship). Giannella, in The Religious Liberty
Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1389 (1967), argues that the tension between the
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created, however, it must be broadly construed so as to include all
religions. 93
Professor Kurland94 contends that government cannot legislatively or judicially confer religious exemptions to general laws which
are within the power of the state to enact. The underlying postulate
of his devaluation of the free exercise clause is the notion that any
form of religious exemption would be a "special privilege" which
would violate fundamental canons of equality and neutrality supposedly inherent in the establishment clause.95 In my opinion, the
Kurland thesis misconceives the reality of the interrelations between
religion and the state. Why should religion in some situations merit
exemption from state-imposed burdens? The answer, I think, is implicit in all of our previous discussion of religious interests and state
power. Religion postulates loyalties to the divinity and to the sect
which are, respectively, superordinate to, and competitive with, that
owing to the state; 96 at the same time, religion has the capacity-as
shown by the Mormons' abandonment of polygamy in the late nineteenth century-to adapt its ethical practices in response to notions
about the proper sphere of secular government. But where the state
interferes with the faith, therapy, and worship functions of religion,
these built-in priorities cannot be so easily compromised. Yet it is in
precisely these areas that government can offer to accommodate religion without having to sacrifice its own secular policies-where the
establishment and free exercise clauses must be resolved in favor of the latter as a
matter of principle. See generally P. Kauper, The Warren Court: Religious Liberty
and Church-State Relations, 67 M1cH. L. REv. 269 (1968).
93. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, !145
U.S. 67 (1953); Parker v. C.I.R., 365 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1966). For a discussion of the
diverse theories, see Seeger v. United States, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd on other
grounds, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (impermissible classification); Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d
233 (2d Cir. 1961) (violation of free exercise clause); Fellowship of Humanity v.
County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957) (establishment of
preferred sects).
94. Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 4-5, 96
(1961).
95. See id. at 26, 96.
If indeed the establishment clause is but the means of attaining the end specified
by the free exercise clause, that would seem to cut in favor of a flexible reading of
the former in deference to the latter. Actually, the two clauses cannot be so easily
reconciled, especially in light of the altered character of federalism and the greater
involvement of secular legislation in achieving positive social aims. Hence, it would
seem more accurate to recognize the inherent tension between the two clauses, since
that would force one to face frankly the question of which is to prevail in particular
situations. See Giannella, supra note 92, at 1386-90. It is just this inherent conflict
between the two clauses which, unhappily, precludes there being a unitary general
theory of religion in the Constitution.
96. United States v. Madntosh, 382 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Chief Justice Hughes,
dissenting); United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 808 (2d Cir. 1943).
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religious practices in question are either intrinsically harmless to
society or are confined within the sect. Moreover, the public generally does not feel that religious exemptions confer "special privileges"; a basic operative fact about religion-one that is widely
understood-is that it imposes severe duties of its own which may
more than compensate for any additional freedom granted by an
exemption. Finally, religion properly conceived is not something
that can be invoked at will, as can free speech; rather, it is a condition defined in terms of status as opposed to situation. Therefore,
the free exercise clause need not be relegated to a subordinate role.
b. Compulsion of action or submission. In the public health
field, the state has an interest in compelling universal action or
submission (such as a required vaccination) when it is essential to
preserve the life or health of its citizens. Nevertheless, since government compulsion of action or submission touches a sensitive nerve
in the American conscience,97 the state should be required to satisfy
a particularly high burden of justification where the compulsion is
contrary to religious tenets-especially when the religious system
defines the compelled action as inherently sinful. Here the state's
burden can be met only by showing a clear and present danger of
some substantial harm to society which is within the state's power
to control. Of course, adoption of such a test raises additional questions: ·what kind of deference is owed to the legislature's determination that danger exists? What are the relevant forms of danger
against which the state may act through compulsion? How immediate must the danger be before the state can intervene by this
method? 08
c. Direct and secondary prohibitions. The state has a legitimate
interest in prohibiting unwanted conduct and in regulating certain
other activity in order to encourage socially desirable results. Criminal law embodies society's notions of what would undermine its
minimal moral cohesiveness and physical security. Conduct which
is viewed as inherently evil (murder, rape, armed robbery, and kid97. Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1941) CTustice Frankfurter, dissenting).
See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Turner v. Turner, 192 S.2d 787 (Fla.
App. Ct.), cert. denied, 201 S.2d 233 (Fla. 1967); cf. School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 250 (1963) CTustice Brennan, concurring).
98. These last two questions tend to merge into one; the threat of contagious
disease is a form of danger against which the state may act through compulsion, even
where there is no recent relevant experience with the particular disease. Wright v.
DeWitt School Dist., 385 S.W.2d 644 (Ark. 1965). But, the danger must be to
society at large. In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). And the
danger cannot be merely speculative. In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 589,
enforcing 375 U.S. 14 (1963) (per curiam).
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napping, for example) is directly prohibited. Where the evil is not
so grossly offensive and dangerous (and assuming it can be isolated
and effectively quarantined), the rationale underlying such prohibitions seems less compelling.
Direct prohibitions should not be confused with secondary prohibitions when criminal sanctions are attached for failure to conform to certain minimal standards of conduct. Cases involving the
first amendment often involve such regulatory "crimes"; while the
state-regulated activity is not inherently evil, it may cause general
and perhaps severe inconvenience to the community because of the
manner of its occurrence. For example, the ordinance challenged in
Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington) 99 sought to prevent littering
of the streets-a desirable social objective. Unfortunately, the state
chose as its method of regulation a ban on the distribution of literature; since this amounted to prohibition of an activity protected by
the Constitution, the ordinance was invalidated. The accepted rule
of decision in controversies involving secondary prohibitions of this
type is that the law must be narrowly drawn in respect to the specific
evil.100 It has been suggested that a weighing test be used in those
instances where it is difficult to separate speech itself from its harmful incidents.101 But the only thing that is properly "weighed" in
such cases is the appropriateness of the form of the activity in relation to its own inherent purposes.102 The essence of speech and
assembly is that it takes place in public; yet regulation is proper
when the speaker deliberately blocks traffic or invades the privacy
of the home.103 The same is true with religious action: while evangelism would be meaningless if it could not be pursued in public
places, there is no compelling reason why a worship service must
99. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
100. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Thus, in the situation presented
in Schneider, the state could have attached sanctions directly to the littering itself,
rather than to the distribution of handbills. 308 U.S. at 162.
101. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
102. Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939).
103. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943);
Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (dictum).
Another way to make this point is to refer to the distinction between speech in
its "natural" form and the mechanism of its dissemination. The more traditional the
latter, the more it supposedly merges into speech itself. Perhaps this was what Justice
Douglas meant in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943), when he stated
that "[t]he hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary
evangelism-as old as the history of the printing presses." More "modern" mechanisms, which by their very nature may be more disturbing, are probably also more
relevant to contemporary society. Such mechanisms may sometimes involve a captive
audience. Kovacs v. Cooper, supra, at 83, 86-87. See Trinity Methodist Church v.
Federal Radio Commr., 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (denial of license of defaming
broadcaster).
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take place anyvvhere that the religious group desires.10 4' In short, if
the public manifestation of religious conviction is logically and traditionally related to protected activity, mere public inconvenience is
not a sufficient justification for prohibiting it altogether.
d. Welfare legislation with indirect e[fects. Perhaps the most
complex mode of state action is economic or social legislation whose
effect on religious freedom is only indirect. Two factors explain
this complexity. First, the burden upon religion varies so widely
from case to case that no rule of thumb, like those in cases prohibiting
a particular practice, could be attempted which would be remotely accurate. Second, the burden does not always focus specifically upon
any particular religious practice accurately classifiable as belief,
worship, or ethical action, but may cut across all the functional
components. Often this kind of legislation forces the religious practitioner to choose between his religion and some natural or statecreated benefit that he could otherwise enjoy.105 The state's concern
here is not with any specific evil associated with a particular religious practice but instead with a "positive" good for society in
general. Direct and secondary prohibition represents society's underlying consensus of the limits of socially permissible behavior, while
social legislation having indirect effects reflects society's particularistic inclination to define the quality of life and to insure that all
its members participate therein.
The proper role of the legislature in these cases is to formulate
social policy and to balance the goods and evils which may result
from its implementation. The exercise of legislative power in this
realm should be accorded prima fade validity under whatever constitutional authority it is exercisable; it is not the proper function
of courts to engage in a balancing process similar to, if not more
limited than, that which the legislature has already undertaken. The
appropriate judicial test is two-pronged. First, when the "hard
choice" for the religious practitioner is the necessary consequence
of the policy objective advanced by the statute itself, then the legislative scheme should be given a very heavy presumption of validity.106
104. Compare Matthews v. Board of Supervisors, 203 Cal. App. 2d 800, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 914 (1962), with Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136
N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956). These and other zoning cases are collected in
Fernandez, Free Exercise of Religion, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 546, 586 n.242 (1963). Cf.
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
105. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961).
106. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961), provides, I submit, the perfect
illustration of this proposition; one key passage answers petitioner's contention that
the state is constitutionally required to provide a Sabbatarian e.xemption to its
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Thus, the burden should be on the religious claimant to show that
the preponderant purpose or effect of the legislation is to discriminate for or against some readily cognizable sect; in practice, this
could be shown only where the statute explicitly or implicitly uses
a religious test.107 Second, where the claim is made that a scheme
can be administered in two or more ways, the burden should be on
the state to show that the substantive policy is incapable of implementation by any method of administration which does not impinge
upon the religious practice.108 Using this two-pronged approach,
courts would be understandably reluctant to carve out religious
exceptions to welfare legislation; since these laws are not drafted
in terms of specific religious practices, to create an exception would
be directly or indirectly to rewrite their substantive provisions.100

3. Physical Harm: Of What and to Whom
Can physical harm within a religious group be tolerated? This
question evokes basic attitudes toward the role of the state with
respect to self-degradation, both physical and psychological. On the
level of state power, it is said that the first amendment is never an
excuse for harmful overt action. 110 True as this may be in the
political arena where the dissemination of ideas is the instrument
Sunday-closing law: "Thus, reason and experience teach that to permit the exemption
might well undermine the State's goal of providing a day that, as best possible, eliminates the atmosphere of commercial noise and activity. Although not dispositive of
the issue, enforcement problems would be more difficult [with a Sabbatarian exemp•
tion] •••." In other words, the legislative policy was not simply to provide a day of
rest; rather, the objective of having a day of peace and tranquility required that
there be one common day of rest. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450-52 (1961).
Another example is presented by State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896
(1966), where an Amish parent was convicted for refusing to send his son to a school
that qualified under the state education law. Although superficially only the parent's
"ethical practice" of sending his child to a nonqualifying Amish school was infringed,
what was actually at stake, according to the Amish, was the preservation of their whole
way of life. Nevertheless, it is within the power of a state to require a minimum level
of education for all. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (dictum). Clearly
the predominant intent or effect of the educational requirement was not to outlaw
any Amish practice. Cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). Although coercion was
involved, that difficulty is resolved under the parens patriae doctrine. State v. Perri•
cone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
107. See Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
108. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The reason why the exigencies of
administration of the government's program command such a low priority is, in brief,
that administration is an "executive" and not a "legislative" function; it is merely
the "adaptive" subsystem of the political structure in that its main concerns are
relevancy, efficiency, and flexibility in respect to some substantive policy, and none of
these qualities are necessarily related to the policy itself.
109. See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 651 (1943) Gustice Frankfurter,
dissenting).
110. Emerson, supra note 70, at 917.
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for achieving desired ends, it is not self-evident in situations where
the action itself may be a necessary religious expression of cult goals
and values-the harm being confined within the group. It appears
that the question of intragroup physical harm has never been
squarely confronted in the free exercise area, but the weight of
judicial authority, at least by analogy, supports the conclusion that
the state can act in such situations.111 The view is that physical
activity does not cease to be the state's business merely because individuals happen to carry it out within the confines of a welldefined group. Such a view, however, assumes that people form
groups for the purpose of carrying on harmful activity, while the
reality for many religions is just the reverse: it is the religion itself
which determines its own values and goals and specifies what action
is appropriate to achieve them. To illustrate, suppose that some
imaginary nonaddictive but potentially dangerous drug is used as
the sacramental medium in a religious rite. Unlike a refusal to
accept a life-saving blood transfusion, the consumption of the drug
is not a passive act which could be described as simply letting nature
take its course. And, although the drug taker wills the act, he does
not necessarily will the resulting disability (assuming that it is medically uncertain whether it will occur).112 It is the individual who acts,
but it is the group acting collectively to apply social pressure which
probably constitutes the dominant motivation to take the drug.
'Which way does this group pressure cut? It may be that the state
should tolerate some room for individual freedom of choice, in
which case the boundaries of the religious sect provide a ready-made
mechanism for isolating and quarantining an undesirable practice
within the group. If, however, the drug is particularly dangerous,
the state may have a strong interest in entirely prohibiting group
influence which encourages a destructive practice. State legislatures
probably have the power to declare anything harmful, even if there
is little or no scientific evidence to support such a conclusion.113
When, however, legislation impinges upon a constitutional area of
privacy, mere assertions by the state unfounded in fact need not be
111. In Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942), the handling
of poisonous snakes was held to be within the state's police power, and hence there
was no real constitutional issue. And in People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d
SU!, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964), although peyote taking was upheld, it was found not to
cause any physical or moral harm. Finally, in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
163, 165-66 (1878), it was thought that polygamy was harmful not just to the Mormons
but also to the general social and political order.
112. In short, assume that consumption of the drug is analogous to smoking
cigarettes while knowing that some serious lung disease may result.
113. People v. Glaser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 819, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1965).
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taken at face value. 114 In the public health field, the state need only
show that a disease exists in North America and that it is communicable in order to justify compelled action or submission. 115 But
in the case of sacramental drugs, where the danger of the harm's
spreading is a sociocultural rather than a physical phenomenon, the
state should have the burden of proving that the likelihood of
physiological injury is substantial.116 And if the issue is in doubt,
expert scientific and medical testimony can be taken at the trial.

III.

.APPLICATIONS

As mentioned earlier, the sociological analysis outlined in this
Article is capable both of resolving prior decisions in the free exercise area and of clarifying elements that ought to be considered in
future cases. Because of the variety of factors involved, I shall not
attempt to catalogue all of the abstract rules in all of their possible
applications; instead, I will apply selected principles to familiar
fact situations in an attempt to illustrate the analytical technique to
be employed in all free exercise cases. Of course, the guiding principle is one of defining interests on both sides of the controversy.
A. Definition of Religion
The threshold question is what constitutes religion for purposes
of invoking the free-exercise clause. The first significant judicial
attempt to define religion in modern times was made by Chief
Justice Hughes: religion is "belief in a relation to God involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation." 117 The
Second Circuit made the next definitional attempt in construing
the phrase "religious training and belief" in the selective service law:
Religious belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as
a means of relating the individual to his fellowman and to his
universe-a sense common to men in the most primitive and in the
most highly civilized societies. It is a belief finding expression in a
conscience which categorically requires the believer to disregard
elementary self-interest and to accept martyrdom in preference to
transgressing its tenets. 118

Another federal court of appeals, however, defined the same phrase
114. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
115. E.g., Wright v. DeWitt, 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965).
116. This assumes, of course, a bona fide constitutional claim. People v. Woody, 61
Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). There, however, the court did not
indicate how much the state must adduce in the way of proof.
117. United States v. Madntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1930) (dissenting opinion).
118. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
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in terms of a relationship with a "Supreme Being," 118 and this requirement was adopted by Congress in subsequent formulations of
the selective service law. 120 Nevertheless, after the Supreme Court
had said, in a different context, that it was a violation of the establishment clause for the state to favor religions based upon belief in
God over religions founded upon different beliefs,121 it followed
that this construction of the selective service law was unacceptable.
A new judicial definition was offered, phrased in terms of the functional importance of the belief to the individual in question: "[T]he
test . . . is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful
occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by
the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the
exemption."122 Thus, many varieties of moral and philosophical
tenets may now qualify one for exemption, despite the Court's disclaimer with respect to these as well as political, sociological, and
economic beliefs.123 Paradoxically, while the Court rejected a classification based upon the contents of belief, it referred to the latest
trends in theology and provided such disparate statements of the
core of religion as, "[m]eaning within meaninglessness, the power
of Being," and "[d]evotion of man to the highest ideal he can
achieve ... [the] power that inspires moral purpose." 124
Welcome as this liberalization may be with respect to a legislative exemption from compulsory military service, it must not be
adopted for free exercise cases generally. Theoretically, the definition focuses too exclusively upon the individual and the content
of his belief and results in a form of cultural relativism in which
every belief is its own standard.125 Moreover, the definition tends to
119. Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795
(1946).
120. 50 U.S.C, app. § 456(j) (1964). This definition was eliminated in the 1967
amendments to the selective service statute. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456G) (Supp. III, 1965-1967).
121. Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
122. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).
123. See the facts of the three cases reviewed in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 165-69 (1965).
124. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180, 183 (1965).
125. But see Giannella, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV, L. REv. 1381,
1423-31 (1967). Professor Giannella, although denying equal standing to practices advancing an individual's psychological or spiritual development, would open the door to
those nontheistic manifestations of conscience that are intensely felt, selfless, and based
upon humanitarian values. Not only does this position frankly depend on the author's
evaluation of good morals and theology, but it also necessitates an inquiry into the
claimant's subjective sincerity, and into the question of whether or not his specific
nontheistic objection is founded upon "religious" belief. But since (apart from situations where the claimant is a member of a religion in the sociological sense) there
is no frame of reference for saying whether or not a belief is founded upon a
claimant's religion (except by means of a test of intensity or ultimate concern), the
individual could, under such a theory, pretty well write his own ticket.
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promote the factor of sincerity-admittedly useful for purposes of
determining standing-into substantive doctrine; it is precisely this
factor which provides the motivation for exaggerated claims and the
mechanism for fraudulent ones. How is a court to decide whether
a claimant is sincere in his beliefs, or sincere only in his desire to
avoid some secular duty? 126 Furthermore, to measure the religious
claim according to degrees of intensity of individual belief is to
rely on a subjective factor which is both practically difficult for the
trier of fact and theoretically lacking in the rationality needed to
produce a stare decisis effect over time. Under this standard, a court
would presumably have to have separate "rules" for individuals of
the same religion who hold a particular tenet with varying degrees
of intensity. Rather than adhere to such a subjective test, I would
agree that, even where sincerity is present, "not ... any conduct can
be made a religious rite and by the zeal of its practitioners swept
into the First Amendment." 127
I am certainly willing to admit that considerations of personality
(commitment, sincerity) and culture (tenets, theology) can be important. Moreover, presumptions favoring sincerity, as well as loose
standards for ascertaining the "object" of belief, are useful and
proper-although perhaps a requirement that there be a system
or hierarchy of beliefs should be added.128 But what is ultimately
required is a sociological component to the definition of religion.
Thus, at a minimum, a religion should have a social structure that
extends beyond the individual and his kin.129 Moreover, the religious
group (and also the particular practice involved) should either have
a history of, let us say, more than a generation, 130 or it should be
characterized by a significant, persisting, and organized following
of a charismatic leader. Such a leader is defined as one who has had
a direct encounter with the divine and has thereafter preached the
new power and structure of his faith through both explicit teachings and the force of his personality. Finally, a sect cannot be considered a religion unless some of its behavioral patterns can be characterized as worship or sacrament.
126. Sincerity is sometimes inferred from the claimant's willingness to face the
consequences. In re Jenison, 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515 (1963). But this may obviously be the result of a utilitarian calculation of the lesser of two evils.
127. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943).
128. This would guard against the possibility of someone claiming that his religion
consists of a single belief that just happens to conflict with the law under which he
is being prosecuted. See State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966).
129. Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 693, 315
P.2d 395, 406 (1957).
130. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943); People v. Mitchell, 244
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This sociological definition of religion establishes the minimum
requirements necessary to raise a constitutional issue under the free
exercise clause. The definition does not undermine anyone's legitimate rights, and it serves to aid courts both in recognizing genuine
interests and in disposing of fraudulent claims by those who seek to
excuse unlawful conduct by invoking the free exercise clause. Even
a so-called "religion" which turns out to consist entirely of moral
tenets would not be significantly worse off than if it had been
properly definable as a religion in the first place, since ethical action
is the weakest of the religious interests in any event. Furthermore,
adherents of a "religion" that does not qualify as such retain the
rights of free expression131 and free association. 132 Finally, in a very
few instances, such persons may be able to argue that their practices
are protected under the residual right of privacy. 133

B. The Proof of the Pudding
In applying the sociological analysis to various familiar fact
situations, we shall begin with cases in which the conflict between
religious and governmental interests is minimal and then discuss
instances where the conflict is more acute. For example, evangelical
activity by Jehovah's Witnesses involves religiously motivated ethical
action directed toward society in general. Entirely apart from free
exercise claims, execution of the divine command to preach in
public is a form of activity protected by the free speech and press
clauses of the first amendment.134 The state may not legitimately
prohibit protected religious activity, but may regulate its side effects; the controlling principle is that a regulation, to be valid, must
be narrowly drawn to cover a specified social evil. If the objective is
to prevent fraud, the state can require disclosure of information; 135
if the aim is to raise revenue, it can levy a tax on net income or on
property; 136 if the purpose is to defray expenses of providing addiCal. App. 2d 176, 52 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1966); People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr.
69, 73, 394 P.2d 813, 817 (1964).
llH. E.g., Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
132. E.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
133. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roberts v. Clement, 252 F.
Supp. 835 (E.D. Tenn. 1966). But cf. People v. Glaser, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432 (1965)
(rejecting a Griswold-type argument in respect to private use of marijuana).
134. Fernandez, The Free Exercise of Religion, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 546, 563-66, 58182 (1963); Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. I,
44-52 (1961).
135. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
136. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943).
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tional services necessitated by the particular religious activity, it can
scale its tax schedules accord,ingly.1s7
United States v. Kissinger138 presented an example of a general
law that indirectly impinged upon a person's religious beliefs. There
the federal government attempted to collect civil penalties from
petitioner for exceeding his wheat quota; petitioner argued unsuccessfully that it was contrary to the Holy Scripture for him to limit
his production. Unlike situations presented in the Sunday-closing
law cases, Mr. Kissinger was forced to make a choice regarding only
an ethical practice, and he made no allegation that submitting to
the government regulation would constitute a sin for him. In fact,
it is doubtful that the tenet which he invoked was derived from his
religion at all; even if it was, his religion probably did not fall within
the suggested sociological definition. In any event, it is to be recalled
that deference to the legislature is the proper rule where the questioned regulation (wheat quotas) embodies the very policy (limiting
wheat marketing) that is the object of the law. 139
At first glance, Kissinger would seem to be indistinguishable from
In re Jenison 140 in which defendant's refusal to serve on a jury was
also motivated by a moral tenet. In Jenison, the state employed the
sanction of civil contempt in order to effectuate a policy of ensuring a universal supply of jurors. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the contempt conviction, but the United States Supreme Court
reversed. The Jenison case is distinguishable from Kissinger on the
ground that when the state attempts to compel someone to engage
in activity-particularly continuing activity-contrary to religious
precepts, it is subject to greater limitations than when it passes a
general law forbidding certain activity.141 The argument could also
be made that the real policy of the state was to achieve a representative, rather than a universal, selection of jurors; thus, the com137. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1943).
138. 250 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1958).
139. See text accompanying note 106 supra. Incidentially, it was pointed out by
the court in Kissinger that claimant was hardly prohibited from growing as much
wheat as he wanted, but only from selling the excess over the quota. 250 F.2d at
942-43.
140. 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515, reversed per curiam, 375 U.S. 14, enforcing
267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963). See text accompanying note 38 supra.
141. However, if the conscientious objection were solely moral or political, it
would yield to the state requirement. In other words, the fact of compulsion is very
likely to have severe repercussions in the therapy subsystem. See Supreme Court Note,
79 HARV. L. REv. 105, 115 {1965). Whether this is the case should be ascertained by
the trial court. I cannot agree, therefore, with the proposition put forth by Fernandez,
supra note 134, at 565-66, that the free exercise clause, outside of worship and sacrament, is merely an embodiment of the equal protection notion.
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pulsory feature was merely one possible mechanism of judicial
administration.
The state can demonstrate a more compelling interest in a case
like People v. W oodruff. 142 There a contempt conviction was upheld
against a woman who refused to testify before a grand jury concerning an alleged violation of the state narcotics law on the ground
that her Hindu belief prohibited her from doing anything which
might harm others. Here, as in Jenison, an ethical tenet was set off
against a penalty narrowly drnwn to effectuate its goal. This time,
however, the element of compulsion was legitimized by the integral
part which grand jury evidence played in the state scheme for controlling crime; the appropriateness of the contempt conviction derived from the fact that the state needed this particular individual
for her intimate acquaintance with the relevant facts. In re Jenison,
on the other hand, parallels conscientious objection to military
service: 143 in theory, the draft system needs everybody, but in reality
it does not-as presently constituted-require those few individuals
with religious objections.
Sherbert v. Verner144 resembles In re Jenison in that a universal
law relating to the execution of governmental policy was involved
in both cases. But since Sherbert presented no problem of physical
coercion, it might seem that the state interest should have prevailed.
Of course, it can be argued that Sherbert involved an impingement
upon worship as opposed to ethical tenets, but that was also true in
the Sunday-closing law case. 145 In any event, the teaching of Sherbert
is to be found in an analysis of the word "administration." In the
Jenison case, the goal of the state was to provide a proper jury. In
Braunfeld v. Brown, 146 the legislation to enforce Sunday closing
aimed at ensuring one uniform day of rest. In the latter two cases,
it would have been incorrect to characterize the regulations as
merely administrative because the governmental policies were embodied in the very provisions that were violated by the religious
claimants.147 Sherbert, on the other hand, involved "administra142. 26 App. Div. 2d 236, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966). See text accompanying notes
35-37 supra.
143. The Minnesota Supreme Court thought so too, but in a different sense, i.e.,
they compared jury duty with the duty to bear arms, and came to the opposite conclusion than the one proposed here. 265 Minn. at 99, 120 N.W.2d at 518-19. Incidentally, I do think there is a constitutional requirement of a religious-objector
exemption to the draft. See note 141 supra.
144. !174 U.S. 398 (1963). See note 106 supra and text accompanying note 27 supra.
145. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961).
146. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). See text accompanying note 26 supra.
147. This is a difficult notion to grasp, partly because such words as "policy,"
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tion" in its stricter meaning: administration of a scheme to confer
the specified benefits.
Functionally speaking, administration is the political system's
analogue to ethical action in the religious system: the criteria for
this form of "adaptation" are again such neutral norms as "suitability," "efficiency," and "flexibility." For example, in Sherbert the
South Carolina Employment Security Commission decided that
petitioner's unavailability for Saturday work on religious grounds
triggered that provision of the unemployment compensation law
which disqualified workers who failed to accept suitable jobs when
offered. It is conceded that the state's policy can be defined in
terms of a class eligible for the benefits it bestows, 148 but for that
classification to prevail over a first amendment claim it must logically
relate to the statute's goal in the narrow sense. It would be logical
for South Carolina to ·withhold benefits from nonproductive members of society-those who are unwilling to work at all-since the
purpose of an unemployment compensation scheme is to provide
funds in lieu of wages when workers unexpectedly lose their jobs and
must seek other employment. But on the facts of Sherbert, the state
did not contend that petitioner failed to come ·within the scope and
intent of the statute; rather, the claim was that if she were allowed
to collect while remaining idle, the door would be open to fraudulent claims which would both deplete the state's funds and discourage
employers from scheduling Saturday work. Yet the policy of providing unemployment benefits was neither to prevent fraud nor to influence businessmen to decide what days to remain open. Thus, the
justification for depriving petitioner of her benefits was purely administrative: to conserve and allocate resources in order to achieve
the policy of the statute. The state had no necessary commitment
"purpose," "goal,'' "object," and "aim" have a dual meaning. On the one hand, they
refer to "ultimate ends" definable in terms of health, welfare, and so on (e.g., "to
further the health and productivity of workers"); on the other hand, they refer to
immediate goals definable only by a tautological statement incorporating the terms
of the statute (e.g., "the 'goal' of unemployment compensation is to provide funds
for workers who are unemployed"). We use these words only in the latter sense. To
do otherwise would be to open the door to justification of requirements totally unrelated to the statute except by an upwards leap to superordinate ultimate goals.
To wit, "Since the purpose of Sunday-dosing laws is to help produce more efficient
workers, a relevant way of administering this policy would be to require all laborers
to attend trade school for four hours on Sunday morning." I do not imply an answer
to the problem of whether or not the state has power to enact such provisions in
general, but only that they would not be upheld under the Braunfeld principle
against attack under the free exercise clause.
148. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (nonavailability of Social Security
benefits).
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to any particular means of coping with problems incidental to the
achievement of its policy. This explains why it is reasonable in cases
involving "administration" to require the state to "demonstrate
that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses
·without infringing First Amendment rights.'' 149 It is not enough
for the state to show that the questioned regulation is the most
efficient way of administering the statutory policy; it must prove
that no other reasonable method is available that would be likely to
effectuate that policy.
Turning to the criminal law, prima fade the state interest in
prohibiting acts generally considered to be evil in themselves outweighs the religious interest in ethical action; this may not be the
case, however, if the practice is worship or sacrament and clearly
confined within an established and well-defined sect. Accordingly,
Reynolds v. United States, 150 declaring polygamy unlawful, was
rightly decided. "Polygamy, although a basic tenet of theology of
Mormonism, is not essential to the practice of the religion.'' 151
Rather, the moral tenet only motivated action toward other human
beings, who-though they may have been conditioned to accept their
fate-were relegated to such a status of inferiority that the state
might well have anticipated harmful effects to the social and political spheres of the Mormon community.152 Moreover, since the state
does not approve of polygamy as a status, an argument premised on
Griswold is thereby undercut; the concern of bigamy laws is not
with the acts within the family unit but rather with the legitimacy
of the status itself.
Handling poisonous snakes is a primitive practice of a religion
which, taken as a whole, probably cannot be considered to be primitive. 'While the practice appears to be ritualistic, the ethical aspect
is equally prominent: it is a form of evangelism in which the believers' power of faith is demonstrated to an audience in order to
induce them to become true believers. Although some precautions
are taken to prevent the snakes from escaping into the crowd, these
protections are often insufficient to preclude potential danger.153
Therefore, the state is justified in prohibiting the ethical practice
in order to eliminate the danger.
Fortunetelling must similarly be classified as an ethical practice
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407, 410 (1962).
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76, 394 P.2d 813, 820 (1964).
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878).
Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948).
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insofar as it relates to the external environment and is practiced
upon people who are not cult members, even though they may believe in it. Moreover, to the extent that fortunetellers customarily
ply their trade individually, they may not act in a religious capacity.
In any case, the state interest is not to interdict actions causing
physical injury, but merely to protect people from their own gullibility.154 Thus, it is not necessary to prohibit fortunetelling under
all circumstances, but only when it is done for a fee. 155 The Supreme
Court has often supported efforts to isolate commercial exploitation
conducted under the guise of some alleged first amendment right.m
On the other hand, state statutes have consistently been construed
not to ban seances, particularly if they take place in "church."167 The
location of the seance need not itself be decisive, however, since
wherever conducted the practice can be characterized as worship with
strong overtones of communion. Although pecuniary exaction may
be involved here as well, it is not for the purpose of commercial
gain.158 Even if the state did consider seances to be morally harmful,
it has a rather weak interest in preventing such intragroup activity.
Another contemporary problem arises when a court is called
upon to direct a compulsory blood transfusion to an adult in order
to save his life. In such situations, a court is neither invoking criminal
law nor suppressing worship. If a policy approach to balancing is
used, it is tempting to say that the strong state interest in preserving
the life of its citizens should prevail. Under a closer analysis, however,
the answer is not so simple. Jehovah's Witnesses regard themselves as
under a divine command neither to give nor to receive blood transfusions. This is premised on the belief that "[t]he blood is the soul"
(Deuteronomy 12:33) and that "[w]e cannot drain from our body
part of that blood, which represents our life, and still love God with
our whole soul, because we have taken away part of 'our soul-our
blood-' and given it to someone else."159 This prohibition is an
154. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 93 (1944) (Justice Jackson, dissenting).
155. E.g., State v. Neitzel, 69 Wash. 567, 125 P. 939 (1912).
156. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942). This line was also pursued briefly in respect to the Jehovah's Witness
penchant of asking for money when distributing their religious tracts. Jones v. City
of Opielka, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
157. Dill v. Hamilton, 137 Neb. 723, 291 N.W. 62 (1940); State v. Delaney, 1 N.J.
Misc. 619, 122 A. 890 (1923).
158. This can be compared with passing the collection plate, an analogy which
was incorrectly applied to evangelism in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111
(1943). The consent to pay should be pre-existing, not the result of an on-the-spot
sales pitch.
159. From, BLOOD, MEDICINE, AND THE LAw OF Goo, quoted in In re Brooks' Estate,
32 III. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (excerpted).
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ethical tenet insofar as it is a universal norm prohibiting action in
the external environment. That interpretation is supported by the
seeming historical and sociological origins of the command: it appears to be directed against cannibalism and animal sacrifice, a
crucial focus in the differentiation of ethical monotheism away from
idolatry and primitive notions of magic. At the same time the quoted
Biblical passages seem to have no bearing at all upon blood transfusion; in fact, the Jehovah's Witnesses' doctrine gives the appearance
of being a tragic theological mistake. This illustrates an important
point made earlier about ethical practice: it should not be difficult
for a religion faced with current pressures from the external environment to reinterpret its ethical tenets without in any way altering the
fundamental faith or mode of worship.
But our analysis of the religious interest does not end here. The
moral tenet involved in refusing a blood transfusion is unique because of its necessary implications for the therapy function of religion. Most moral transgressions involve a sin against God, but the
sinner may receive forgiveness if he is later truly penitent. No such
mechanism is available to a Jehovah's Witness who receives a blood
transfusion-even if his conscience has remained pure-because it is
the very condition or status of having alien blood ("soul") in his body
that creates a permanent alienation from God. This conclusion is not
totally free from doubt; indeed, it may be only the act of exchanging
blood that is sinful, rather than the resulting status. This was hinted
at in Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown
College, 100 where petitioner argued that, if responsibility for the
transfusion would be accepted completely by the judge and the
hospital, the matter would be so far out of her hands that she would
not be accountable to God for her act. But that attitude may not
have been representative of her faith; the judge himself was apprehensive that the mounting pressure of the situation in the hospital
may have caused her convictions to waver.161 In the future, this issue
should be explicitly decided with the aid of "expert" testimony by
leading Jehovah's Witnesses learned in that sect's doctrine of sin.
If the religious interest in refusing a blood transfusion is greater
than at first appeared, the interest of the state is somewhat less
compelling. Where there are no public side effects, passive suicide
160. 331 F.2d 1000, 1007-09, petition for rehearing en bane denied, 331 F.2d 1010
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Jones v. President&: Directors of Georgetown College,
377 U.S. 978 (1964).
161. 331 F.2d at 1007. If this is so, her sin might have been even greater to have
so ignored the prescription of her sect.
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is of little concern to the state. The court in In re Brooks' Estate162
agreed with this proposition; not only does a patient's refusal to
accept a blood transfusion involve no danger to other members of
the community, but to hold otherwise would entail the conclusion
that the individual has ultimate value only as a cog in the state
machine. "In the final analysis, what has happened here involves a
judicial attempt to decide what course of action is best for a particular individual, notwithstanding that individual's contrary views
based upon religious convictions."163 In a different context, Justice
Brennan stated, "But we must not confuse the issue of governmental
power to regulate or prohibit conduct motivated by religious beliefs
with the quite different problem of governmental authority to
compel behavior offensive to religious beliefs." 164 Accordingly, in
order to justify a compelled blood transfusion, the state should show
a clear and present danger of some substantive evil to society; it
should not be able to meet this burden merely by pointing to a
law against attempted suicide.165 On the other hand, cases in which
the believer directly or indirectly attempts to make the life or death
decision for someone else-an infant or an unborn child-can be
easily distinguished. 166 But should the fact that a dying parent has
minor children also be sufficient to uphold state action compelling
a transfusion? Following the principle that the state may compel
action contrary to religious belief only when substantial harm to
others is threatened, I would distinguish between the case of very
young children for whom loss of the mother would be likely to
result in severe emotional and psychological strain, and the case of
older children for whom the father, school, and peer groups could
provide an adequate substitute.167 Expert testimony from psychologists would be helpful in drawing the line.
A particularly acute confrontation between strong interests of
religion and the state would occur where drugs, whose possession or
use is prohibited by the criminal law, are employed for worship and
162. 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
163. 32 Ill. 2d at 373, 205 N.E.2d at 442.
164. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 250 (1963) (concurring opinion).
165. But see Recent Development, Authorization of Involuntary Blood Transfusion
for Adult Jehovah's Witness Held Unconstitutional, 64 MICH. L. R.Ev. 554 (1966).
166. See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J.
421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J.
463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
167. In Application of Georgetown Hosp., 331 F.2d 1000 (1964), the mother,
significantly, did have an infant only seven months old. See also Comment, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 860 (1966).
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sacramental purposes. Fortunately for judges, many possible claims
can be disposed of prior to a test on the merits. First, the defendant
in a drug prosecution may lack standing to make a free exercise
claim either because he does not belong to a group qualifying as a
religion under the comprehensive definition set forth above, or
because of a lack of sincere commitment to the sect. It would not be
sufficient for the claimant to assert that the group has some doctrinal
connection with a traditional religion such as Buddhism; rather,
the practice of using drugs itself must have historical antecedents or
be instituted by a charismatic religious leader. Moreover, there
should be direct personal contact at some point in time between the
alleged sect member and the historical movement he claims to be
part of. For example, one should not qualify as a member of the
Native American Church (Indian peyote worship) just because he
has read about it and has decided that some of its practices or ideas
appeal to him; the situation would be different, howevP:, .:,hould he
enter a monastery or Indian reservation and undergo the total discipline of the church. Since the rationale for giving a preferred
position to religion relates largely to its character as a status or
obligation to which one is more or less permanently committed, it
follows that if a person is able to turn his commitment on and off
at will, he will be in a lesser position to claim special treatment.
Thus, an isolated individual formally unrelated to any church or
sect cannot achieve an exemption from narcotics laws just because
he "believes in" taking drugs and can quote authority for his belief. 168
The second condition for weighing the religious interest against
the state interest in controlling narcotics is that the use of the drug
should be confined to worship--preferably as a sacramental medium.
Even if a claimant belongs to a church that uses drugs in this manner,
he is clearly not protected if he should be apprehended at home in
possession of narcotics. 169 To hold otherwise would be to open up
the possibility of using nominal religious affiliation to evade the
narcotics laws.
Finally, where drug consumption is part of worship, the ceremony
must be scrutinized closely to determine whether its predominant
168. People v. Mitchell, 244 Cal. App. 2d 176, 52 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1966).
169. See State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966). But, in In re Grady,
61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964), a defendant convicted for pos•
session of narcotics in his house was granted a new trial on the issue of whether or
not he actually engaged in good faith in the practice of his religion. However, other
people were seen going in and out of his house, so that an inference could be drawn
that a religious meeting took place there.
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purpose is ritual. If the emphasis is either upon heightened perception and awareness of the physical environment, or upon feelings of
· benevolence and good will toward one's friends, then the practice
cannot qualify as worship. In the leading case in this area, People
v. Woody, 170 these phenomena were present, but they were considered by members of the Native American Church to be secondary
to the primary functions of peyote-an object of worship and a
sacramental medium. The California Supreme Court held that the
state narcotics law could not constitutionally be applied to penalize
the use of peyote as a part of the Indians' religious ceremony.
It might be objected that this reliance upon sacrament and
worship leaves in doubt the status of the mystic-one who communes
directly with the Deity. Unfortunately, there is no way for a court
to determine whether a given individual is capable of communicating directly with God; to accept assertions of this capacity at face
value would again invite wide-ranging evasion of the law. If the
mystic has a significant following, perhaps he could qualify as a
charismatic religious leader. In any event, the narcotics laws do not
prohibit mystical experiences as such, but only their inducement
by artificial means.
When the drug-taking ceremony does qualify as worship or
sacrament, application of the narcotics laws would destroy the substance of the religion; therefore, in order to override the strong
religious interest, the policy and scientific foundations for application of the criminal law should be very compelling. Peyote has
hallucinatory effects lasting about twelve hours and sometimes causes
acute anxiety, but its symptoms are not permanent and it is nonaddictive.171 Here, the state interest is probably not strong enough to
prohibit use of the drug. If the state cannot ban the use of peyote in
a religious service, a fortiori it cannot prohibit the use of marijuana
for the same purpose; the effects of marijuana are of short duration,
and it seldom results in aggressive or antisocial behavior. Moreover,
the causal connection between taking marijuana and subsequently
taking physiologically injurious drugs, such as heroin, has not been
proved. 172 LSD, although also nonaddictive, is much more potent in
its "severe untoward psychological effects," with symptoms resem170. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
171. Jarvik, Drugs Used in Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, in L. Goom,IAN &:
A. GILJ\IAN, THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 189, 205 (1965).
172. Jaffe, Drug .dddiction and Drug .dbuse, in L. GOODMAN &: A. GILMAN, supra
note 171, at 208.
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bling schizophrenia which cannot be predicted in advance.173 Arguably, an individual should be allowed to play this form of Russian
roulette, particularly if consumption is part of a religious service.
However, LSD not only has severe psychological and physiological
effects long after it has left the blood stream, but it also may seriously impair the person's ability to make rational decisions many
weeks after he has taken one dose.174 There is also some evidence
that the "religious experience" effect of LSD does not lead to genuine religion, since it fails to produce "a continuing pattern of discipline."170 For these reasons, LSD can be constitutionally withheld
from religious use. 176
IV.

CONCLUSION

The main concern of this Article has been the formulation of
a workable theory for assessing free exercise claims-a theory that
depends upon the process of defining the interests involved in a
given case in terms of formal categories of general applicability
which posit their respective "weights" largely without reference to
policy preferences. But why, one may ask, is it necessary to put so
much weight upon sociological theory, particularly when the more
"enlightened" trend in contemporary religious thought is toward
reliance upon individual conscience and humanism rather than
transcendentalism, superst1t10n, and church-prescribed dogma?
Should not some weight be given to conscientious objections to civil
and criminal laws based upon personal natural theology intensely
held, particularly if based upon unselfish and humanitarian universalistic values? Under such a test, the court would go beyond
merely inquiring into sincerity as a means of assessing standing but
rather would seek to determine if failure to sustain the conscientious
173. Jarvik, supra note 171, at 208.
174. Farnsworth &: Prout, HARVARD UNIVERSITY HEALTH SERVICES REl'ORT ON DRUGS
(1967).
In any event, it does not seem likely that cases involving LSD or other more harmful drugs will arise; not only will the "sect" probably fail to qualify as a "religion"
under the definition proposed in this Article, but also few genuine religions founded
upon such patently self-destructive practices will be able to maintain their identity
as a group for extended periods of time.
175. Professor Huston Smith of M.I.T., The Boston Globe, April 20, 1967, at 12.
176. However, where marijuana is involved, the state interest is so weak that even
a lesser religious interest might prevail. See In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728,
39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964). In such a case, the state is in effect prohibiting the consumption of "evil" sensations. The analogy with developments in the law in respect to
obscenity and morals is compelling.
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objection would result in a fundamental sense of alienation-analogous to sin-from one's very being.177
There are several theoretical and practical difficulties with such
a construction of the free exercise clause. First, the fundamental
sense of guilt or alienation referred to would probably arise only in
those few cases where the individual was compelled to act or
acquiesce over a considerable span of time in a way which would
substantially affect his present and future life. But one in such
a position can avail himself of a therapeutic remedy simply by being
true to his conscience. A member of a religious group may, it is
true, have available the same mechanism of therapy, but the source
of the mechanism lies in an authority which competes with government at the visible level of structure and worldly action. In short,
there is a certain logic in the thought that the Framers set aside an
area for that which is, as practiced, on the same level as government
and which is therefore necessarily competitive with it. To have based
the exemption instead directly upon the source of religious authority, whether it be God or personal conscience, would have been
to posit a superior-inferior relationship between the individual and
government which could be invoked by anybody with sufficiently
strong convictions. The result would be that governmental authority
would be potentially threatened at all points and at all times. An
exemption socially determined, on the other hand, would be limited,
easy to ascertain, and designed to avoid random conflicts between
the individual and authority which could ultimately result in political conflict.
Second, the psychological examination of the individual necessitated by the personal-conscience approach would be susceptible to
attempts at deception. As a matter of practice, such an approach
would entail reliance upon finders of fact in an area where "fact" is
an illusory concept; the fact finders would undoubtedly be prejudiced by their feelings about the religious tenet invoked or the
policy embodied in the law sought to be enforced.
Nevertheless, the criticism of a sociological approach to the free
exercise clause based upon the notion that it embodies an outdated
dependence upon organized and superstitious religions has a certain
rhetorical point. I can only repeat that, given our philosophy that
government has only those powers delegated to it by the people, it
177. Giannella, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1381, 1426,
1428-29 (1967).
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was thought that in establishing the rules of the political process, a
further disengagement had to be made respecting the one realm in
man's experience which was competitive with government in its
structure and in its claims to loyalty and obedience. Religion, like
government, was usually practiced within social organizations which
prescribed discipline and duty for their members. Moreover, the
very multiplicity of sects and denominations in early America tended
to make religious practices self-contained. Above all, the drafters
may have thought a clause protecting religious free exercise would
pose no danger to government because religion did not really have
much to do with real life but only with speculation about the nature
of the Universe and of God. To the extent that this assumption has
proven unfounded in the light of new trends in theology and
religious practice, it must be confessed that the free exercise clause
is so much of an historical anomaly. Unfortunately, a resolution in
favor of accommodating individuals who object to government regulation on the basis of their own consciences cannot properly be
obtained under the free exercise clause itself; the adoption of that
doctrine would have such a fundamental impact upon the structure
of duly constituted governmental authority that a constitutional
amendment would, I think, be required.
Nevertheless, some positive, if less radical, benefits have accrued
from the analysis offered in this Article. For one, most of the past
decisions are supported by the principles elaborated herein. Moreover, the ability to distinguish among ethical action, worship, or
sacrament, or among the various modes of governmental action, does
not require a great deal of expertise in sociology on the part of judges
and lawyers. Indeed, simply uncovering such a multiplicity of factors
and assumptions should promote more searching analyses of first
amendment problems generally. Finally, in respect to the problem of
religion specifically, I have intended this Article to go beyond mere
attempts to formulate legal doctrine. When I have spoken of the
interests of religion as being opposed to the interests of the state, I
have actually been referring to an intertwined complexity-a process
of interaction. However one may feel about whether religion or the
state should triumph in a given case, he should take note of the
dominant characteristic of the American system: that religion and
the state, despite any conflict between their ultimate loyalties, have
been able to adjust to each other. In those few situations where there
is potential for a serious clash, both religion and government have
shown the capacity to recognize priorities of interest and to make
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concessio.ns. Of fourse, the establishment clause also serves an
important function by helping to keep potential controversies
involving religion out of the political arena, where heated passions
and demagoguery could only operate to obscure the nature of the
interests at stake, All of these factors have combined to provide what
has been a remarkably satisfactory mechanism for dealing with
problems posed by the citizen's dual allegiance to religion and
the state.

